Western European Defense Spending and Force Structure- To What Ends? by Bird, Robert J., Jr.
St. John Fisher College
Fisher Digital Publications
International Studies Masters International Studies Department
11-20-2009
Western European Defense Spending and Force
Structure- To What Ends?
Robert J. Bird Jr.
St. John Fisher College
How has open access to Fisher Digital Publications benefited you?
Follow this and additional works at: http://fisherpub.sjfc.edu/intlstudies_masters
This document is posted at http://fisherpub.sjfc.edu/intlstudies_masters/76 and is brought to you for free and open access by Fisher Digital
Publications at St. John Fisher College. For more information, please contact fisherpub@sjfc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bird, Robert J. Jr., "Western European Defense Spending and Force Structure- To What Ends?" (2009). International Studies Masters.
Paper 76.
Please note that the Recommended Citation provides general citation information and may not be appropriate for your discipline. To
receive help in creating a citation based on your discipline, please visit http://libguides.sjfc.edu/citations.
Western European Defense Spending and Force Structure- To What
Ends?
Abstract
Western Europeans in the post-Cold War era enjoy unprecedented security at home, and undertake very little
strategic action abroad. The object of this paper is to explain why they nonetheless maintain large military
forces, mostly in Europe, configured and armed primarily for territorial defense. Three general factors
contribute to Western European force structure. First, despite supranational integration and other
encroachments on its authority, the state retains control over defense policy and substantial armed forces
because these – and not international institutions -- remain the ultimate guarantors of its independence and
sovereignty. Second, in contemporary conditions, Western Europeans face increased risk of strategic
abandonment by their superpower Ally, the United States. To avoid encouraging a U.S. withdrawal from
Europe, and to prepare for the consequences of such an eventuality, the European Allies must maintain
capabilities for self-defense and for regional strategic action. Third, manpower-intensive territorial defense
forces apply military spending disproportionately to pay and personnel benefits, and are therefore compatible
(in a way that expeditionary militaries would not be) with the primary welfare role of the European state.
Document Type
Thesis
Department
International Studies
This thesis is available at Fisher Digital Publications: http://fisherpub.sjfc.edu/intlstudies_masters/76
  
 
 
St. John Fisher College 
Western European Defense Spending and Force Structure – To What Ends?  
A Master‟s Thesis submitted to  
The Faculty of the Master of Science in International Studies Program 
In Candidacy for the Degree of  
 Master of Science in International Studies 
by 
Robert J. Bird, Jr. 
Dr. David MacGregor, Advisor 
Dr. Frederick H. Dotolo, Second Reader 
Dr. David M. Baronov, Program Director 
Rochester, New York, the United States of America 
20 November 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Western Europeans in the post-Cold War era enjoy unprecedented security at 
home, and undertake very little strategic action abroad.  The object of this paper is to 
explain why they nonetheless maintain large military forces, mostly in Europe, 
configured and armed primarily for territorial defense.  Three general factors contribute 
to Western European force structure.  First, despite supranational integration and other 
encroachments on its authority, the state retains control over defense policy and 
substantial armed forces because these – and not international institutions -- remain the 
ultimate guarantors of its independence and sovereignty.  Second, in contemporary 
conditions, Western Europeans face increased risk of strategic abandonment by their 
superpower Ally, the United States.  To avoid encouraging a U.S. withdrawal from 
Europe, and to prepare for the consequences of such an eventuality, the European Allies 
must maintain capabilities for self-defense and for regional strategic action.  Third, 
manpower-intensive territorial defense forces apply military spending disproportionately 
to pay and personnel benefits, and are therefore compatible (in a way that expeditionary 
militaries would not be) with the primary welfare role of the European state.   
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WESTERN  EUROPEAN  DEFENSE  SPENDING  AND  
FORCE  STRUCTURE  –  TO  WHAT  ENDS?  
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION:  THE QUESTION, ITS BACKGROUND, REVIEW OF 
EXISTING LITERATURE, AND OVERVIEW OF ARGUMENT 
 
A. The Question 
In the aftermath of the 1999 Kosovo campaign, British Defence Minister (and 
NATO Secretary General-designate) Lord George Robertson remarked that European 
states had dispatched only about two percent of their aggregate armed forces to the 
Balkans, and this slowly and with difficulty.  “If they could not use the two percent 
effectively, then what, Lord Robertson asked his fellow Defense Ministers, was the use of 
the remaining 98 percent of their armies.”1  What, indeed?  The object of this paper is to 
attempt a response to the Defence Minister‟s rhetorical question.  Contemporary Europe 
enjoys unprecedented internal stability and freedom from external threat, while it 
employs military power abroad on only the most limited scale; why, then, do the states of 
Western Europe still maintain large armed forces?      
 
                                                 
1
      Elizabeth Becker, “European Allies to Spend More on Weapons,” New York Times (22 September 
1999), Section A, p. 11 (emphasis added).  Online.  ProQuest Central.  http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb? 
index=90&did=45029342&SrchMode=3&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VNa
me=PQD&TS=1256846512&clientId=4463&aid=3.  Accessed on 22 June 2009.        
 5 
B. European Strategic Policy:  Some General Points and Some Well-Known 
Explanations 
 
Europeans do not fight wars; or, more precisely – and with some diversity among 
the policies of individual states
2
 – the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization have been far less disposed to undertake military action than is the United 
States.  This phenomenon is well-recognized and widely discussed; it is clearly reflected 
in data for combat operations, for non-combat deployments (such as peacekeeping and 
stabilization missions), for casualties, and for combat and expeditionary capabilities.     
The existing literature, taken together, affords a persuasive explanation of 
divergence between European and American strategic policy.  First, attributing it chiefly 
to the transatlantic disparity in military power, Robert Kagan‟s work3 sets forth a 
“capabilities thesis.”  The U.S. occupies a “unipolar” position:  though by no means 
omnipotent, it has no serious challenger for global strategic leadership,
4
 and is without 
peer in its ability to wage war and to project power abroad – capabilities that the 
European states, with partial and limited exceptions, do not possess.  This capabilities gap 
influences psychology, ideology and world view, making the European states far less 
willing than the U.S. to pursue policy objectives by military means.    
A valuable complement to the capabilities thesis rests on principles of political 
economy – specifically, the implications of the “exploitation thesis” for the distribution 
                                                 
2
      The U.K., for example, is closest to the U.S. in willingness to engage in combat and to accept 
casualties.  Germany, at the opposite end of the spectrum, is subject both to unique constitutional 
constraints and special political considerations.  The general tendency, though qualified by a degree of 
diversity, is substantial and pervasive.      
3
      The thesis is set forth comprehensively in Kagan‟s Of Paradise and Power:  America and Europe in 
the New World Order (New York:  Alfred A. Knopf, 2003).   
4
      There are, however, numerous challengers seeking positions of regional hegemony; this is, for 
example, the aspiration to which Russia is reduced. 
 6 
of costs in providing public security goods.
5
  A strategic interest is a “public good” to the 
extent that the producer cannot practicably withhold the benefit from others.
6
  A large 
and wealthy state has greater means to produce public security goods, and derives greater 
benefit from them, than do smaller countries.  The theory predicts that it will take steps to 
produce its desired level of security, even if other states that enjoy benefit withhold active 
assistance.
7
  Smaller (and weaker) states, therefore, can enjoy a “free ride” on the efforts 
of the great power – can benefit from the public security goods it provides, without 
making proportionate contributions.
8
  The relative efforts and costs borne by the U.S., 
and by its European Allies, are broadly consistent with the predictions of the exploitation 
thesis:  the “unipolar” U.S. contributes a disproportionate share, while the smaller powers 
of Western Europe under-contribute in proportion to the benefits they may receive.
9
  For 
the many security interests that are public goods, therefore, economic theory points in the 
same direction as Kagan‟s capabilities thesis.  
                                                 
5
      The leading exposition is in Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of 
Alliances,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 48, no. 3 (August 1966):  266-279.  Online.  JSTOR.  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1927082.  Accessed on 12 May 2009.  For a later work elaborating on the 
theory as applied to NATO (and proposing various refinements and qualifications not here material) see 
Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, The Political Economy of NATO:  Past, Present, and Into the Twentieth 
Century (Cambridge, U.K.:  Cambridge University Press, 1999).  The phrase “exploitation hypothesis” 
appears in Sandler and Hartley at pp. 34-36.    
6
      Olson and Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” p. 267.  Public security goods may 
include, among others, containment of dangerous common adversaries; prevention of conflict in vital 
regions; freedom of the seas and airways; access to economically critical resources; arms control and non-
proliferation; etc.  Security goods, to be sure, may be “impurely” public -- not equally available to or 
enjoyed by all beneficiaries; and particular military measures may produce more than one kind of security 
benefit.  See Sandler and Hartley, The Political Economy of NATO, pp. 34-36.    
7
      Olson and Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” pp. 269, 272, 274.   
8
      Ibid., pp. 274, 278. 
9
      As for strategic capabilities and actions outside Europe, the evidence is unambiguous, in the scale of 
U.S. overseas military deployments; in deployment capabilities; in blue-water naval formations; and in at 
least some military actions (for example, the ejection of Iraq from Kuwait in 1991).  All of these have, at 
least in part, served to advance public strategic goods such as freedom of the seas, Persian Gulf security, 
deterrence of potential aggression in East Asia, suppression of international terrorism, and others.  Western 
European contributions to these efforts, weighed collectively, have ranged from limited to negligible.  By 
contrast, the Western European states have always made significant contributions to security and stability 
within Europe -- an interest shared by the U.S., but more immediately affecting Europeans.           
 7 
A diverse body of scholarship, meanwhile, emphasizes aspects of European 
political culture evolving in the postwar era that likewise incline European states against 
military action.  First, the discrediting of and European retreat from imperial power 
eliminated a leading basis for strategic engagement abroad.  As noted by Hurrell and 
Menon, decolonization reduced even the strongest of the imperial powers to second-rank 
status; profoundly affected domestic society and politics; and propelled a reorientation of 
their foreign policies and economic relations firmly toward Europe.
10
  Second, as Tony 
Judt has argued, the central and defining feature of the European order, and the chief end 
of state power, has become the implementation of “the „European model of society‟” -- 
the welfare state
11
 -- in which military power is a disfavored alternative to social 
spending.
12
  Third, though the state remains the locus of security policy, it suffers from a 
“legitimacy squeeze.”  Economic and political integration,13 and internationalist theories 
of political authority,
14
 strengthen supranational and multilateral processes at the expense 
of the state.  Meanwhile, as Le Galés and Crozier find, consumer culture, individualism, 
“identity” politics, and attenuated nationalism diminish citizens‟ deference to state 
                                                 
10
      Andrew Hurrell and Anand Menon, “International Relations, International Institutions, and the 
European State,” in Governing Europe, eds. Jack Hayward and Anand Menon (Oxford:  Oxford University 
Press, 2003), pp. 395-412, at p. 406. 
11
      Tony Judt, Postwar:  A Brief History of Europe Since 1945 (New York:  Penguin Press, 2005),        
pp. 748, 792-3.   
12
     Malcolm Chalmers, “The Atlantic Burden-Sharing Debate – Widening or Fragmenting?” International 
Affairs 77, no. 3 (July 2001):  569-585, at p. 577.  Online.  Military & Government Collection. 
http://libdb.sjfc.edu:2500/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=485
6459&site=ehost-live&scope=site.  Accessed on 13 February 2007.      
13
      Robert Cooper, “Integration and Disintegration,” Journal of Democracy 10, no. 1 (1999):  8-21, at    
p. 16.  Online.  Project MUSE – Basic College Collection.   http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ journal_of _ 
democracy/v010/10.1cooper.html.  Accessed on 8 May 2007.     
14
      Jed Rubenfeld, “The Two World Orders,” The Wilson Quarterly 27, no. 4 (Autumn 2003):  22-36, at 
p. 25.  Online.  ProQuest Research Library.  http://libdb.sjfc.edu:2500/login?url=http://proquest. 
umi.com/pqdweb?did=465703261&sid=6&Fmt=4&clientId=4463&RQT=309&VName=PQD.  Accessed 
on 3 April 2007.   
 8 
authority.
15
  The nation-state‟s freedom of action is impaired by its loss of political 
supremacy, its new “intermediate position between sub-national and international 
constraints and demands.”16  This trend is peculiarly prominent, perhaps uniquely 
influential, in Western Europe.   
 
C. Overview of the Argument 
 The literature, in short, affords persuasive explanations for the relative aversion of 
America‟s European Allies to military action.  What it does not address directly or fully 
is their continued maintenance of large military forces -- despite the disinclination to use 
them for global strategic contingencies, and the attenuation of proximate threats.     
Before 1990, there were obvious and important reasons for transatlantic 
differences in force structure and deployment.
17
  The persistence of the pattern since then 
is another matter.  Though the Russian threat is diminished and physically more remote, 
though no other significant conventional threat to Continental security has appeared, the 
European NATO states still generally favor large but static manpower-intensive 
militaries, configured primarily for territorial defense.  Ill-suited, and little used, for any 
other operational exigency, they are far less deployable, and far less deployed, than U.S. 
                                                 
15
      Patrick Le Galès, “The Changing European State:  Pressures From Within,” in Governing Europe, 
eds. Jack Hayward and Anand Menon (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 380-394, at pp. 391-
393.   See also Michel J. Crozier, “Western Europe,” in The Crisis of Democracy:  Report on the 
Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission (New York:  New York University Press, 
1975), pp. 11-57, at pp. 47-48.   
16
      Hanns W. Maull, “Europe and the Changing Global Agenda,” in The New Europe:  Politics, 
Government and Economy Since 1945, ed. Jonathan Story (Oxford:  Blackwell Publishers, 1993), pp. 140-
160, at p. 146.    
17
      The U.S. had a uniquely global strategic posture, necessitating forward positions in Europe and East 
Asia, and significant power projection capabilities, especially air and naval forces, as well as a large 
strategic nuclear arsenal.  Between 1945 and 1991, most of the European states (with partial exceptions for 
the U.K. and France, which maintained some global strategic capabilities and had greater defense 
expenditures), were concerned primarily with territorial defense, and so maintained large land armies, with 
substantial complements of manpower but comparatively lower capital investment.       
 9 
forces (even their reserve components).  Military service no longer functions in Western 
Europe as the “school of the nation” -- if only because it is mostly voluntary, and the 
remaining conscription regimes no longer universal.  Nor do European militaries play a 
significant role in routine domestic security functions.   
Why, then, do the Western European NATO states maintain their substantial but 
largely immobile land forces?  My research suggests that the answer lies at the 
conjunction of interstate strategic politics and domestic socio-economic policy.
18
   
First, exclusive control of military power has long been a core element of state 
sovereignty; it stands in sharper relief, in an era of diminished state authority.  Nor is this 
mere symbolism:  even in a Europe of unprecedented peace and order, armed force 
remains the ultimate defense of a state‟s vital interests.  The European Union‟s effort to 
construct a framework for military action to serve its own policies illustrates the political 
significance of strategic capabilities; it also exhibits the member states‟ reluctance to 
diminish their own sovereignty.     
Second, each of the Western European members of NATO must manage alliance 
politics and its hazards.  Divergence of strategic interests, and differences of mutual 
dependence, emphasize the danger of abandonment by an ally in time of need.  The end 
of the Cold War both reduced systemic pressure on the U.S. to cater to its allies, and 
elevated the U.S. to “unipolar” power which -- with European strategic parochialism -- 
                                                 
18
      I confine my analysis to the Western European NATO states.  They possess the greater part of 
Europe‟s economic and military potential; their sovereignty is well-established, not recently emerged from 
Soviet domination.  Greece and Turkey, meanwhile, have atypical geopolitical positions, and armed forces 
unique in NATO.  Unless otherwise indicated, I address the militaries of the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Portugal.     
        
 10 
has aggravated strategic divergence.  The European members of NATO must then seek to 
prevent, and to prepare for the consequences of, strategic abandonment by the U.S.   
Europeans are chiefly concerned with security problems in Europe and its 
outskirts.  NATO and the U.S. provide insurance against the low but catastrophic risk of 
war in Europe.  Lest U.S. intervention be rendered futile, and the U.S. commitment to 
NATO be undermined, the European Allies must maintain adequate defense forces within 
Europe.  Meanwhile, to manage abandonment‟s possible effects, they need forces capable 
of dealing with the regional challenges that are of far greater concern to Europeans than 
to the U.S.  One approach has been pursuit of EU military capabilities; this limited 
experiment is far outweighed, however, by the members‟ own sovereign forces.  These 
serve, moreover, as a hedge against the failure of European integration itself, which could 
occasion the return to Europe of old-fashioned power politics.  
Finally, military forces configured for territorial defense are relatively compatible 
with the primary role of the state in Western Europe as dispenser of public welfare 
benefits.  In general, military spending and welfare-state priorities are opponents in a 
zero-sum game (advantage to the latter).  But spending on military payroll, benefits and 
“consumption,” to support armies stationed at home, contributes to consensus objectives 
of economic redistribution and social stability, by providing public-sector employment 
and complementing civilian benefits programs.   
Domestic political priorities, therefore, move in the same channel as state 
sovereignty interests and the counsels of strategic policy.  They all heavily favor 
substantial territorial defense armies over alternatives – especially over smaller and more 
deployable forces usable in response to global contingencies.     
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II. WESTERN EUROPEAN ARMED FORCES --  SCALE, STRUCTURE,  
AND DEPLOYMENT  
As an initial matter, it is proper to describe common characteristics of Western 
European NATO members‟ armed forces, and to compare them in configuration and use 
with those of the United States.  Despite considerable military diversity among these 
states, key data disclose a prevalent pattern.   
 
A. NATO European Forces and Deployability  
 First, though their forces are smaller than those of the U.S. in raw numbers and in 
proportion to population, the Western European members of the Alliance have substantial 
military manpower.  In 2008, total active-duty military personnel numbered roughly 
1.159 million, with an additional 1.067 million troops in reserve formations; drawn from 
a combined population of roughly 353.8 million.
19
  In terms of the numbers of men and 
women under command, these are large military organizations.
20
   
European forces have long been constituted and armed primarily for a territorial 
defense role.  Throughout the Cold War, they prepared for warfare within a few hundred 
miles of their own territory, a priority reflected throughout their logistical and support 
arrangements
21
 as well as in their armament.  Despite the end of the bipolar confrontation 
                                                 
19
      Data (current as of November 2008) are from the 2009 edition of The Military Balance (London:  
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009).  Active duty forces exclude national paramilitary police 
(Gendarmerie, Carabinieri, etc.) whose functions are chiefly law enforcement and domestic security.  
Reserve forces include such organizations as Britain‟s Territorial Army units and Norway‟s Home Guard.    
20
      In 2008, by comparison, the U.S. had 1.539 million active duty military personnel (0.51 percent of a 
population of roughly 303.8 million), plus 979,000 in various reserve formations.  The data referred to in 
this discussion, mostly from annual editions of The Military Balance, are set forth in Appendix B.   
21
      Rick Atkinson and Bradley Graham, “As Europe Seeks Wider NATO Role, Its Armies Shrink,” The 
Washington Post (July 29, 1996), Section A, p. 1.  Online.  LexisNexis Academic.  http://www.lexisnexis. 
com/us/lnacademic/returnTo.do?returnToKey=20_T6358796688.  Accessed on 19 February 2009.    
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focused in the heart of Europe, in the mid-1990s the European Allies remained notably 
dependent on the U.S. for logistics, command and control, transport, and other 
capabilities;
22
 nor has the picture altered appreciably since then.          
The persistence of the Western European orientation toward territorial defense, 
and concomitantly against expeditionary warfare, is demonstrable through a comparison 
with the U.S. on key measures of strategic mobility.  A proxy for expeditionary capability 
can be derived from airlift (in numbers of transport, cargo and tanker aircraft) and sealift 
(numbers of seagoing vessels for cargo, supply, fuel, transport, command, and similar 
functions beyond coastal waters).  These assets are indispensable for the delivery and 
support of substantial forces in operations beyond their home region.
23
  Hence, the ratios 
of a state‟s aircraft and vessels in these two categories, to its total active-duty military 
personnel, provide a rough but useful measure of expeditionary orientation.    
Pertinent data are set forth in Appendix B (pp. 2-4).
24
  Among the Western 
European states, a degree of diversity is observable.  The U.K. leads consistently in the 
seagoing logistical capacity ratio of vessels to troops, yet has ranged between one-third 
                                                 
22
      Ibid., p. 1 (citation omitted).  
23
      Their critical importance is illustrated by the experience of the Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991.  Initial 
rapid deployment of a deterrent force to Saudi Arabia was possible only by means of U.S. Air Force 
strategic airlift assets, which in the first two days of operations flew 91 missions to Saudi Arabia, and more 
than 70 daily thereafter.  Jeffrey D. McCausland, “Governments, Societies, and Armed Forces:  What the 
Gulf War Portends,” Parameters 29, no. 2 (Summer 1999):  2-21, at p. 5.  Online.  Military & Government 
Collection.  http://libdb.sjfc.edu:2500/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx? direct=true&db= 
mth&AN= 1994441&site=ehost-live&scope=site.  Accessed on 6 January 2009.  Even the relatively 
modest French deployment of 16,500 troops required partial U.S. airlift assistance.  Ibid., p. 7.   
        Meanwhile, movement of heavy forces – vehicles for armored and mechanized units, most other 
equipment, supplies and munitions, and logistical support facilities for a large expedition – was carried by 
sealift.  “[T]hrough the entirety of Desert Shield and Storm, roughly 95 percent of everything required was 
moved by sea. . . .”  Ibid., p. 6.  In general, “[s]ealift remains the principal means of moving vast amounts 
of supplies required by even a relatively small force.”  Ibid., p. 18.   
        Other assets useful in power projection are either not needed in all cases (e.g., intercontinental 
bombers); or are more crucial for other purposes (e.g., main battle tanks, for territorial defense; etc.).     
24
     From The Military Balance (London:  The International Institute for Strategic Studies), various annual 
editions.   
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and two-thirds that of the U.S.  It is followed not too distantly by Germany and Italy; 
France, after major reductions in the late 1990s, is far behind.
25
  Since 1990, meanwhile, 
the leading European states (U.K and France) have had airlift-to-troops ratios one-third to 
one-half the U.S. level.  Even British and French force structures, which have sustained a 
disproportionate share of European deployments, are not primarily expeditionary in 
character.  U.S. deployability ratios have exceeded those of other large states, Germany, 
Italy and Spain, by factors between two and seven.    
The overall picture is perhaps more striking.  In 2007, Western European NATO 
states (with 1.212 million active-duty troops) possessed a total of 554 transport aircraft, 
and 79 seagoing logistical support ships.  The U.S., with 1.506 million troops, had 1907 
transport aircraft, and 216 sealift vessels.  The chief difference in 1990, on both sides, 
was a larger number of troops.
26
  Despite the lower likelihood of major conflict in Europe 
relative to other regions, the vast gap between U.S. and European deployability, 
characteristic of the Cold War, persists.     
 
B. Force Deployment Patterns  
The implications of contrasting U.S. and European force structures are amplified 
by data showing the proportion of active-duty forces deployed or stationed abroad
27
 
during the post-Cold War period.  Not only operational deployments, but the long-term 
                                                 
25
      Several smaller states -- Denmark and Belgium -- have had higher sealift-to-troops ratios than larger 
powers; due chiefly to the disproportionate effect on the ratio of a few additional  ships, where active-duty 
force numbers are relatively low (in 2008, roughly 39,000 for Belgium and 30,000 for Denmark).     
26
      The same European states, with 2.229 million men under arms, had virtually the same number of both 
transport aircraft (567) and sealift vessels (78) as they did sixteen years later; while the U.S., with 2.118 
million troops, possessed 1853 transport aircraft, and 239 sealift ships.   
27
      For purposes of these comparisons, I exclude forces stationed within Western Europe, which for 
Europeans is, of course, not “abroad.”  This excludes substantial U.S. and British, as well as some French, 
forces, most in Germany.  Addition of the figures for U.S. and other forces “abroad” in Europe would 
render still more emphatic the leading U.S., and British, positions in foreign military commitments.     
 14 
positioning of forces abroad – as deterrent or potential response to overseas threats -- 
reflects a commitment to the projection of power as an instrument of policy.  Deployment 
data are in Appendix A.    
For 1990-1991, excluding operational deployments to the Persian Gulf theater, 
approximately 7.5 percent of U.S. forces were stationed or deployed overseas, followed 
closely by both the U.K. and France at about 7.0 percent.  To this must be added the 
short-term Gulf deployments, as of early 1991:  U.S., 697,000 (an additional 32.9 percent 
of total active-duty U.S. forces); U.K., 45,000 (another 14.8 percent); and France, 16,500 
(3.6 percent).
28
  Forces deployed by the other European allies during this period were in 
general de minimis, and far below British and French levels. 
In 1996-1997, with substantial deployments in the Balkans, the French and British 
proportions roughly equaled that of the U.S., at about ten percent; Germany, Italy and 
Spain stood at less than two percent.  In 2002, the U.S. (with 8700 troops in Afghanistan 
and its neighbors) and France had comparable deployment percentages of about 11 
percent; the U.K. stood at 7.6 percent.
29
   
The differences in 2005-2006 reflect, above all, the Iraq campaign:  25.2 percent 
of U.S. active-duty forces were deployed, including 139,700 in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
The U.K., at 9.7 percent, had 9500 troops in Iraq and Afghanistan; France, 8.5 percent, 
1265 troops in Afghanistan.  Denmark and the Netherlands, at 6.5 percent and 5.8 
percent, had 566 and 1115 troops, respectively, between Afghanistan and Iraq.  On the 
                                                 
28
      McCausland, “What the Gulf War Portends,” at pp. 9-10.  Other NATO members deployed modest 
contingents to the Gulf:  Italy, 1200 (0.3% of active-duty forces); Netherlands, 600 (0.6 %); Spain, 500 
(0.18%); Belgium, 400 (0.43%); Denmark, 100 (0.32%); and Norway, 50 (0.15%).  See “Military Statistics 
– Gulf War Coalition Forces By Country.”  Online.  http://www.Nationmaster.com/ graph/mil_gul_war_ 
coa_for-military-gulf-war-coalition-forces.  Accessed on 26 February 2007.     
29
      Smaller states Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands were in these years conspicuous for relatively 
high deployment percentages (the majority for Balkans peacekeeping).   
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other hand, only 2.5 percent of German, 4.7 percent of Italian, and 1.8 percent of Spain‟s 
forces were serving abroad.  In 2008, British and French deployments reached, 
respectively, 12.2 percent (12,450 in Iraq and Afghanistan), and 10 percent (3035 in 
Afghanistan), while the U.S. remained in the lead, but by a lower margin.
30
  
These data demonstrate a hierarchy of expeditionary activity and capability, led 
by the U.S., with the U.K. and France typically close, or next in rank, with seven to 
twelve percent of forces deployed.  The position of France is subject to significant 
qualification:  its vigorous pursuit of private pseudo-imperial interests, especially in 
Africa, by military means
31
 accounts for a large share of its deployments; while its, at 
best, parsimonious approach to any action in coalition with the U.S. contrasts sharply 
with the U.K.  All other Western European NATO states have lower deployment 
percentages -- in most cases far lower -- than the U.K. and France.
32
  Germany, Italy, and 
Spain are conspicuously reluctant to send forces abroad.   
                                                 
30
      The U.S. deployment percentage decline from 2005 appears to reflect return of some forces from Iraq 
and Afghanistan to the U.S. and Germany, replaced by units from Japan and South Korea.     
31
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         Since the independence of its African possessions, for example, France has consistently used its 
military “to install leaders it deems friendly to French interests.  In return, these countries give French 
industries first crack at their oil and other natural resources.”  David Gauthier-Villars, “Colonial-Era Ties to 
Africa Face a Reckoning in France,” Wall Street Journal (May 16, 2007), Section A, p. 1.  See also 
Norman Bowen, “Multilateralism, Multipolarity, and Regionalism:  The French Foreign Policy Discourse,” 
Mediterranean Quarterly 16, no. 1 (Winter 2005):  94-116, at p. 102.  Online.  Academic Search Premier.  
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40SRCSM1.  Accessed on 13 February 2007 (“Mixing business, politics and, security concerns. . . French 
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      This pattern finds an echo in the ratios of states‟ military spending, as a percentage of GDP, to their 
active-duty military personnel, as a percentage of national population – a comparison that indicates non-
payroll military spending, associated with expeditionary and combat capabilities.  Throughout the post-
Cold War period, this ratio was far higher for the U.S. than for NATO Europe (except the U.K. and the 
Netherlands).  See Appendix B, pp. 2-3.   
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A further characteristic of Western European deployments is noteworthy:  most of 
the Allies (except the U.K. and France) have disproportionately favored local and 
regional operations.  In sample years 1996-97 and 2002-03, three quarters or more of 
most Continental NATO states‟ deployments were for peacekeeping and stabilization in 
Bosnia, Kosovo or Macedonia.  Similarly, in 2008, several states had proportionally large 
commitments to UN peacekeeping in Lebanon, a nearby Mediterranean littoral country.
33
  
These patterns illustrate a strongly regional emphasis in European military priorities (and 
probably also a preference for peacekeeping over combat).       
 
C.  Territorial Defense:  Core Purpose of European Militaries  
The primacy of territorial defense for Western European armed forces, and their 
limited deployment capabilities, are widely reflected in the literature.  Yet a defining 
feature of the post-Cold War period has been the diminution of conventional military 
threats in Europe.
34
  Contemporary European planning rests on the assumption that there 
exists little or no risk of external, conventional, land-based attack against mainland 
Europe in the next two decades; even Russia is not expected in this period to field 
sufficient forces to undertake major aggression.
35
  European academic and policy 
thinking has indeed purported to transcend defense, emphasizing a broader if less 
                                                 
33
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34
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Europe,” International Affairs 82, no. 6 (2006):  1059-1075, at p. 1065.  Online.  Military & Government 
Collection.  http://libdb.sjfc.edu:2500/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true 
&db=mth&AN=23750249&site=ehost-live&scope=site.  Accessed on 10 January 2009.   
35
      Michael Alexander and Timothy Garden, “The Arithmetic of Defence Policy,” International Affairs 
77, no. 3 (July 2001):  509-529, at pp. 510-511.  Online.  Military & Government Collection.   http://libdb. 
sjfc.edu:2500/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=4856462&site=
ehost-live&scope=site.  Accessed on 10 January 2009.   
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coherent notion of “security”; but military structures and reforms have not kept pace,36 
and show limited response to the emergence of new potential threats abroad.     
Instead, “despite post-Cold War rhetoric,” European armies differ from their Cold 
War predecessors chiefly in reduced scale.
37
  Their core purpose remains defense of 
national territory against external threat.
38
  Formal statements of policy widely reiterate 
territorial defense as a central rationale for armed forces and military spending.
39
  More 
fundamentally, this role is embodied in the habits of states (reflected in deployment data), 
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Ministry of Defence, 2006), p. 56.  Online. http://www.bmvg.de/fileserving/PortalFiles/ C1256EF40036 
B05B/W26UWAMT995INFOEN /W_2006_eng_DS.pdf.  Accessed on 21 September 2009 (“defending 
Germany against external military threats is and remains the Bundeswehr‟s core function”).   
         “The Army Report 2008.” (Rome:  Rivista Militaire, 2009), p. 27.  Online.  http://www.esercito. 
difesa.it/root/chisiamo/docs_rivmil/rappo08_090429.pdf.  Accessed on 25 October 2009 (The armed forces 
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         http://www.mde.es/ 
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(“Norwegian Security and Defence Policy.  Tasks to be carried out with Allies, and possibly others:  to 
contribute to the collective defence of Norway and other parts of NATO against threats, assault and  
attacks. . . .”).            
 18 
in public expectations, in the institutional cultures of military organizations themselves -- 
impeding strategic reorientation in light of contemporary global conditions.
40
     
The U.K., and to a lesser extent France, with deployment capabilities and 
overseas military dispositions at the high end of the Western European spectrum, are 
partial exceptions.
41
  Beginning with the Balkans wars of the mid-1990‟s, the other major 
European states -- Germany, Italy, and Spain -- showed a modestly increased willingness 
to participate, on a small scale, in selected multilateral operations abroad; but their armies 
are still framed primarily for territorial defense, and based on home soil.
42
   
The greater proportion of all Western European forces is considered “non-
deployable.”  By one estimate, at the end of 2004, the 18 European states in NATO‟s 
integrated command structure could deploy only 50 brigades; assuming force rotation 
requirements, only about 40,000 troops would be available for combat missions at any  
moment.
43
  Material constraints on deployability have arisen from two sources:  legal 
restrictions on the role of conscripts; and the failure to train, organize and equip most 
units for expeditionary operations.
44
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In the late 1990s, most NATO members still maintained conscription regimes that 
barred or restricted deployment of draftees outside national territory.
45
  Despite relatively 
limited training, expertise, and flexibility, conscripts were politically suited to territorial 
defense, and had been needed as a reservoir of manpower to meet the hordes of the 
Warsaw Pact.
46
  Conscript forces proved unwieldy, however, even for regional 
peacekeeping in the Balkans.
47
  Since the late 1990s the significance of conscription has 
diminished markedly; of the major European powers only Germany now retains it.
48
   
The marginal status of expeditionary capability and action is today reflected 
chiefly in states‟ reluctance to finance and organize forces for greater deployability, and 
in political resistance to military operations.  Whether for combat or peacekeeping, 
foreign deployments are politically “contested,” as well as expensive.49  To square this 
circle, many European states have developed, in effect, two forces.  The far greater 
proportion of active-duty troops constitutes a “bulk” military stationed at home, dedicated 
to territorial defense, “unreformed” in structure and training, and comparatively poorly 
funded.
50
  In parallel, small elite units are trained, financed and equipped for  
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peacekeeping or combat deployments, mostly on a multilateral basis.
51
   
This bifurcation is evident, for example, in the Germany force structure.   
The Bundeswehr of the 1990s incorporated “two armies” – a far larger and less well-
equipped main force, including a substantial number of conscripts, dedicated to territorial 
defense; and a much smaller “crisis reaction component,” all professionals, with superior 
equipment, prepared for out-of-area operations.
52
  This was much the same in 2007.  A 
proposed long-term defense reform could ultimately improve deployability.
53
  But in the 
near to mid-term, the Bundeswehr can send only a fraction of its troops abroad at any 
time:  with unit rotation requirements, it was said in 2007 to be “overstretched” at the 
modest deployment level of 3.7 percent.
54
  Reconfiguring a larger portion of the 
Bundeswehr for an expeditionary role would require large investments in training, 
equipment, support capabilities and reorganization, and less reliance on conscription.  
Budget constraints, including continued heavy spending on non-deployable conscripts, 
have impeded reform.
55
  German military spending in general favors salaries and 
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personnel benefits – about 55 percent of the 2007 defense budget.56  This entrenched 
priority, and political barriers to budget increases, impede serious efforts to improve 
deployability.
57
  Meanwhile, conscription remains a consensus policy fixture.  It is cited 
as the basis for a mobilization capability that ensures continued U.S. participation in 
NATO,
58
 and as an institutional guarantee of strategic reticence:  “[a] citizen‟s army is a 
prudent hedge against military interventionism around the world.”59   
 As all this demonstrates -- as a 2006 Defence Ministry White Paper expressly 
stated -- “[d]efending Germany against external military threats is and remains the 
Bundeswehr‟s core function.”60  Beside this central, consensus role, Germany‟s limited 
peacekeeping and stabilization missions are both peripheral and exceptional.   
The attention to Germany in the literature does not imply invidious comparison to 
other large states, Italy and Spain.  Both have lately abandoned conscription; both possess 
appreciable numbers of amphibious ships and craft (Germany does not);
61
 both 
                                                 
56
      North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Press Release -- Financial and Economic Data Relating to 
NATO Defence” (19 February 2009).  Online.  http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2009_ 
02/2009_03 _D34F22C9AE854B7FAA0BB409A21C90D3_p09-009.pdf.  Accessed on 10 March 2009 
(compare the U.S. at 32 percent for “personnel” spending).   
57
      Meiers, “The German Predicament,” pp. 628-629.   
58
      Franz-Josef Meiers, “The Reform of the Bundeswehr:  Adaptation or Fundamental Renewal?” 
European Security 10, no. 2 (Summer 2001):  1-22, at p. 11.  Online.  Military & Government Collection.   
http://libdb.sjfc.edu:2500/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=716
4993&site=ehost-live&scope=site.  Accessed on 29 June 2009 (citing The Inspector-General of the Armed 
Forces, “Eckwerte fur die konzeptionelle und planerische Weiterentwicklung der Streitkrafte” [The 
“Kirchbach Report”], Bonn, 23 May 2000, pp. 9, 22; and Rudolf Scharping, “The Bundeswehr – 
Advancing Steadily into the 21
st
 Century.  Cornerstones of a Fundamental Renewal” [the “Scharping 
Report”], Bonn, June 2000, Sections 13, 16, 20, 59-60).  See also German Federal Ministry of Defence, 
“Conscription” (25 October 2006).  Online.  http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/kcxm1/04_ 
Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnz0vM0Y_QjzKLd4k3cTcHSUGYxvqR6GJu5gixoNQ8fW99X4_83FT9AP2C3NCIck
dHRQCs3f1L/delta/base64xml/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS80SVVFLzZfRF8zM1FG?yw_contentURL=/C1256F12
00608B1B/W268SF2G013INFOEN/content.jsp.  Accessed on 21 September 2009 (“mobilisation and the 
build-up capability cannot be accomplished without universal conscription and reservists”).        
59
      Meiers, “The German Predicament,” p. 625;  Meiers, “The Reform of the Bundeswehr,” p. 12.   
60
      “White Paper 2006,” p. 56.   
61
      See The Military Balance (2009 edition), pp. 125, 133, 152.   
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contributed forces to the Coalition in Iraq;
62
 and Spain‟s purchases of transport aircraft 
have given it an airlift ratio superior to Germany‟s.  In other respects, however, these two 
states are inferior, or at best comparable, to Germany in expeditionary capability (sealift 
and airlift) and performance (deployments abroad).  And even British and French forces -
- the most potent, flexible and deployable in Europe -- are markedly less capable of 
power projection and expeditionary operations than those of the U.S.     
Though there are important differences among NATO Europe‟s military forces, it 
is nonetheless clear that all of the Continental militaries share a predominant orientation 
toward territorial defense.  This, despite the attenuation of external conventional threats, 
through the military retreat and weakening of Russia, and the considerable progress in 
consolidating Europe, including much of its eastern marches, under the banners of both 
NATO and the EU.   
Thus, again, Lord George Robertson‟s question:  what is the purpose of these 
large, yet mostly undeployed, mostly non-deployable forces?      
 
                                                 
62
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III. STATE SOVEREIGNTY   
A. Armed Forces and Statehood:  Substance and Symbol   
The first part of an answer to this question rests upon the long-standing and vital 
nexus between authority over military forces and sovereign statehood.   
In many respects the state‟s authority has been diminished:  from above by 
multilateralism and European integration, from within by a variety of domestic social and 
political changes.
63
  The nation-state nonetheless remains the primary locus of democratic 
legitimacy.
64
  As such, it naturally holds an effective monopoly on the affirmative use of 
military power,
65
 accountable to the national public that mans and pays for it.  Yet state 
control of armed forces is also a matter of potent necessity.  Military power is still a 
cornerstone of the state‟s authority, independence, its very existence (albeit a cornerstone 
obscured by the recession of external military threats, the prevalence of intra-European 
peace, and an exuberant overgrowth of postmodern internationalism).     
It may be a truism, but one worthy of occasional acknowledgment, that “[t]he 
fundamental objective of every nation is to secure its vital interests while maintaining its 
own standards and values.”66  The ability to employ physical force against threats to a 
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state‟s territorial integrity and political independence, and to secure other life-and-death 
interests, is the ultima ratio of sovereign statehood, the last resort for its preservation.  
Were a state to rely, not on its own power, but on the kindness of strangers for the 
vindication of its vital interests, it would necessarily also cede to others the authority to 
determine what those interests are and how to advance them.  A state in such position has 
foregone the substance of its independence.   
This is not to suggest that a state must be able to defend itself alone against any 
and all adversaries.  Participation in a coalition or alliance is quite compatible with 
sovereignty, where the cooperating members share a predominant common purpose.  In 
joining such a group, however, the individual state must be able to contribute capabilities 
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integrada que o Estado portug
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and resources useful to the group‟s ends.  Otherwise its allies, deeming the state‟s 
participation of small account, or even dispensable, will tend both to disregard its 
preferences and to exact a price for any protection they confer.   
National defense capabilities remain necessary, despite the apparent prevalence of 
stability and peace in Europe.
67
  This is true not only for the larger powers, but also for 
the smaller states:  if they wish to avoid political dependence on France and Germany, 
and to participate in the councils in which strategic policy is discussed and influenced,
68
 
states such as the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway must maintain the ability to make 
valuable contributions to coalition defense.   
Above this enduring foundation of strategic substance has risen a more visible 
superstructure of political symbolism.  Security and defense policy are widely seen as the 
“last bastion of national sovereignty.”69  Maintenance of, and direct control over, armed 
forces have become attributes of the sovereignty and political independence that they 
actually exist to preserve.
70
  This is best illustrated by the efforts (described below) of the 
European Union to develop military capabilities.    
Thus military power is a badge of sovereignty.  More fundamentally, however, it 
is the ultimate defense and arbiter of sovereignty, and a medium of exchange among 
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states collaborating in the pursuit of common strategic purposes.  Token or ceremonial 
militaries do not suffice:  these purposes require armed forces in scale and kind capable 
of material contribution to the defense of vital state interests.   
 
B. European Integration and Military Power  
As the ultimate sanction of independence, the possession of and command over 
military power have, by a natural process of association, become public symbols of state 
sovereignty, even political identity.  This is illustrated by efforts to promote defense 
policy integration in Europe.  European states‟ reluctance to embrace these initiatives at 
the expense of their own authority, meanwhile, points to the irreducible substance 
underlying the symbolism.   
(1). ESDP in Outline 
The leading institutional challenge to the sovereignty of European states arises 
from European integration.  Under strong currents of policy convergence, broad swaths 
of authority are now shared between national capitals and the supranational European 
Union; but matters of defense, security and foreign policy have remained essentially 
national.
71
  Since the early 1990s, however, the EU has worked gradually to develop a 
European Security and Defense Policy (“ESDP”).   
ESDP is an institutional framework to devise EU policy on matters of common 
interest in foreign affairs and military matters; it is also a platform for the application of 
                                                 
71
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military power to advance common aims.  The 1992 Petersberg conference defined a set 
of military functions for EU attention:  humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping, crisis 
management, and limited peacemaking operations.
72
  Spurred by the experience of the 
Balkan wars, the EU‟s 1999 Helsinki conference set new goals for ESDP including, 
above all, a “rapid reaction” force of 60,000 troops, dispatchable on two months‟ notice 
and sustainable for a year in the field, with a complement of aircraft and ships.
73
   
On foreign and defense policy, the EU acts on the basis of intergovernmental 
cooperation, without authority to bind any unwilling member state; indeed, any policy or 
action requires unanimous assent.
74
  Under the proposed Treaty of Lisbon, successor to 
the rejected EU Constitution, “[m]ilitary capabilities remain in national hands,” and “all 
contributions to [EU military operations] will always be on a voluntary basis.”75  All 
military units, equipment and financial support for ESDP actions must be subscribed by 
member states from their own standing forces and budgets;
76
 they remain subject to the 
contributor‟s sovereign authority, and can be withheld as a matter of course from any 
proposed operation.
77
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(2). ESDP and the “European Project” 
ESDP‟s purpose has not been only, or even primarily, means for collective 
responses to security problems; it is also aimed at the deepening of European integration 
as an end in itself.
78
  This project is not universally accepted; 2005 French and Dutch 
referenda rejected a proposed EU constitution, suggesting that construction of a European 
political identity has limited momentum beyond the circles of the Eurocracy.
79
  Its 
proponents have thus deliberately pursued a process of European “nation-building,” to 
enhance EU political legitimacy through formation of a European identity, a collective 
supranational self-awareness.
80
  By vesting the EU with some role in framing strategic 
policy, and some capability to carry it into effect, ESDP would appropriate the symbolic 
value of military power as an attribute of political sovereignty, and would thereby serve 
as a focal point for nation-building -- a means for the EU to increase its stature at home as 
well as on the global stage.
81
   
(3). EU Member States:  Reticence and Reservations 
After the 1999 Helsinki Declaration, EU members soon earmarked impressive 
troop strength for ESDP functions (subject to the right to withhold them from operations).  
Yet critical deficiencies were quickly evident -- in the sophisticated equipment, command 
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and control, and logistical support required for effective operational deployment.
82
  EU 
members have since repeatedly failed to meet self-imposed targets for ESDP capabilities, 
and in 2004 -- purportedly as an interim measure -- agreed to replace the “rapid reaction” 
force with a modest array of small “battlegroups.”83      
Limited capabilities are reflected in limited operations.  The largest to date, the 
EU‟s succession to NATO peacekeeping in Bosnia, involved at peak 7000 troops; most 
other ESDP missions have been primarily civilian; all have been militarily unambitious in 
scope.
84
  This is less a matter of resource limitations than of political constraints:  the 
dependence of any operation on an essentially ad hoc process of coalition formation, on 
finding voluntarily contributed forces and funds, and on averting exercise of the veto 
implicit in the unanimity requirement.
85
   
For ESDP to organize usable power, EU members must compromise traditional 
sovereign control over (their) forces and military policy.
86
  This is, in the near future, 
unlikely.  Many observers rightly emphasize strategic divergence between the U.S. and 
“Europeans,” yet it does not imply convergence of policies and interests within Europe.  
To the contrary, EU members are strongly differentiated in their approaches to security, 
in their attitudes to the use of force, power projection, foreign intervention, and to the 
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proper balance between power and political influence.
87
  The “Atlanticism” of the U.K, 
the Netherlands and Denmark, for example, persistently contrasts with “Europeanism” in 
France, Spain and Belgium.
88
  Partly for this reason, Europeans do not accept any one 
state as their natural leader in defense policy;
89
 further, those states with relatively 
capable forces have stronger misgivings at the prospect of submitting them to the 
political control of others.
90
   
To the extent, then, that ESDP betrays a persistent “gap between rhetoric and 
capacity, between the real world and the EU world,”91 it is chiefly because EU members 
resist the diminution of their own sovereignty, and insist on consensus as the basis for 
collaboration under the EU flag.
92
  Cession of more substantial defense authority to the 
EU would compromise a key residual block of members‟ exclusive sovereign power; 
indeed, it might well mark a point of no return for the post-Westphalian state in Europe.  
There is no great disposition among EU members to take this leap beyond current 
intergovernmental cooperation on defense policy.
93
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C. Conclusion 
Efforts to cultivate EU-directed military capabilities, and the reluctance of EU 
members to sacrifice the substance of their military authority, are pertinent here to 
demonstrate the political significance of military resources and command.  To the EU and 
the proponents of further European integration, military capabilities are a visible public 
symbol of autonomous political identity:  more a vehicle for the ideational project of 
“constructing Europe” than an instrument of usable power.  Armed forces bear symbolic 
value for the states too; value that may be particularly important in a climate of political 
integration, regarded with hesitancy by substantial parts of their national constituencies.  
Unlike the EU, however, the states have a more fundamental, more substantial reason to 
maintain significant military power:  their independence and territorial integrity rest 
ultimately on the ability to defend them against armed threat or attack.  For the states of 
Europe, armed forces are not primarily symbols; they are still “the first and last bastions 
of sovereignty.”94         
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IV. THE ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA AND EUROPEAN ARMED  
FORCES 
Relations among allies entail two opposing dangers – “entrapment” in another‟s 
policies, and “abandonment” by an ally when its aid is needed.  Mutual interdependence 
mitigates, and strategic divergence aggravates, these hazards.  With the end of the Cold 
War, the unipolar U.S. is less concerned with NATO cohesion, and more interested in 
exigent problems beyond stable Europe.  Hence the Western European NATO states must 
deal with the risk of abandonment by the leader of their Alliance.  By reason of proximity 
(and with U.S.-provided global public security), Europeans are most concerned with 
security problems in Europe and environs.  Management of the abandonment hazard 
therefore demands local and regional military capabilities, both to limit the risk of U.S. 
withdrawal, and to mitigate its consequences if it should materialize.   
 
A. Alliance Politics and the “Security Dilemma” 
The “alliance security dilemma” was comprehensively outlined by Glenn Snyder 
in 1984.
95
  Alliance politics, in all phases and strategic environments, essentially involves 
balancing a state‟s policy between the dilemma‟s opposing horns:  cohesion with and 
support for allies, at the risk of compromising its own interests; and divergence from 
them, at the risk of isolation.
96
  For NATO, the dilemma expresses itself in terms of a 
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dichotomy between the European powers and the U.S. as hegemonic leader.  If smaller 
states support the dominant ally, they may be “entrapped” in its blunders, or in pursuit of 
priorities they do not share; if they withhold support, or adopt alternative policies, the 
unipolar power may abandon them:  deny them, then or later, to lesser or greater extent, 
its aid and support.
97
  The choices, and their results, tend to mirror the alternatives;
98
 
measures to manage one horn of the dilemma tend to aggravate the other.  Strong 
commitment, to dissuade an ally from abandonment, reduces a state‟s influence, and 
increases its exposure to entrapment.99  Weakening commitment or withholding support 
may avert entrapment,
100
 but at the expense of increased abandonment risk.    
Abandonment and entrapment presuppose differences, in substance or degree, 
between the interests of allied states.
101
  Thus a key variable in the alliance dilemma is 
the degree to which allies share interests potentially in jeopardy.
102
  Another factor is 
mutual dependence; a function of each ally‟s strength and degree of conflict with an 
adversary.  An alliance is “a continuous bargaining process,”103 and the party that least 
needs its allies‟ support holds greatest leverage over them.  Entrapment occurs when a 
state cooperates with an ally for the sake of an alliance it values more than the expected 
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cost of cooperation; hence dependence on an ally magnifies entrapment risk.
104
  A less 
dependent state, meanwhile, will be readier to resist others‟ preferences and to assert its 
own.
105
  Dependence obviously bears also on the potential costs of abandonment.
106
   
A more general factor driving the severity of entrapment and abandonment risks 
is the character of the interstate strategic system itself.  In a “multipolar” environment, 
such as 1914 Europe, there are a several leading powers; none preeminent, each with 
interests more or less compatible or conflicting with those of potential allies and foes.  
Alliances are unstable, abandonment an omnipresent prospect, because mutual 
dependence coexists with multiple realignment options.
107
  After 1945, a “bipolar” 
system emerged:  two opposing political-military blocs, each led by a predominant 
power, formed the poles of a stable strategic confrontation, whose ultimate prize was the 
freedom or domination of Europe.  Entrenched antipathy, based largely on antithetical 
political and economic systems, severely restricted realignment options and hence the 
risk of abandonment.
108
  Since abandonment was so unlikely, a reluctant ally could avoid 
entrapment simply by disassociation from -- could even try to restrain -- another state‟s 
policy, with little fear of the latter‟s defection.109  Disagreements between the U.S. and 
European allies in the 1970s,
110
 for example, did not herald the collapse of NATO but 
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rather persisted within it, “precisely because the alliance cannot break up.”111  But this, 
Europeans suspect, is no longer the case.   
 
B. Alliance Security Dilemma in a Unipolar System  
The balance of dependence in an alliance, and the degree of policy divergence 
among allies, are variable over time, influenced for example by changes in the security 
environment or by perceptions of individual states.
112
  Transition from one systemic 
structure to another produces tectonic shifts in alliance dynamics.  The end of the Cold 
War, and the emergence of a unipolar strategic environment, have had profound effects 
on NATO through changes in the pattern of mutual dependence among the Allies, and in 
the divergence of priorities, and even the devices, of policy.  A key consequence has been 
an aggravated potential for abandonment of the European Allies by the preeminent U.S.       
(1). Diminished Systemic Pressure for Cohesion 
 One crucial implication of the shift to a unipolar strategic system is that the U.S. 
has far less need to maintain formal alliances such as NATO.
113
  Western Europeans‟ 
reliance on NATO is itself presumably less urgent than in the days when the Red Army‟s 
legions faced westward a few hundred (or dozen) miles away, yet even for low-end 
problems such as the Balkans crises, they have leaned heavily on American capacity for 
decision and action.  The U.S. need for NATO is, by contrast, far less exigent.    
Since World War II, the U.S. has received little affirmative assistance from 
European Allies (except the U.K.) in dealing with strategic problems outside Europe.  
Today it expects little of Europeans, beyond preservation of a general peace on the 
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Continent.
114
  Loss of Europe to Soviet subversion or assault would have produced a 
dangerous shift in global power, but that sort of threat is no longer on the horizon.
115
  The 
lesser tasks lately taken up by NATO – Balkan stabilization, democratization of Eastern 
Europe -- have been intrinsically more important to Europeans, by reason of their 
proximity to the hazards involved; their disproportionate reliance on U.S. capabilities to 
address these regional problems undermines American fidelity to the Alliance.
116
 
 NATO‟s relatively lower importance to the U.S. is itself a reason for Europeans to 
apprehend a danger of abandonment;
117
 not, perhaps, in the form of actual denunciation 
of the North Atlantic Treaty, but more likely in diminished American attention and 
support for European interests on regional security problems.
118
       
(2). Strategic Divergence  
Divergence of strategic interests is a prerequisite for both entrapment and 
abandonment.  As Galia Press-Barnathan has explained, in the unipolar environment, not 
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only is alliance cohesion weaker than under Cold War bipolarity, but policy divergence is 
more pronounced.
119
  The perception of threats, and identification of problems requiring 
action, differ between the hegemonic leader and the smaller allies.
120
  Above all, the 
unipolar power has global strategic capabilities and concerns, while the weaker states are 
disposed to concentrate on nearby, “regional” problems.121  So predicts Kagan‟s 
capabilities thesis:  possessing the preeminent means for global action, the U.S. is 
inclined to undertake it; the Western Europeans, lacking the means to act globally, prefer 
to act (and so also to think) locally.   
This was largely true during the Cold War, too.  But Europe is no longer the 
cockpit of global confrontation, the chief focal point of U.S. strategic interest.  Without 
the unifying Soviet threat,
122
 it has become a region of comparative “strategic calm.”123  
Under these favorable circumstances, contrasts between U.S. cosmopolitanism and 
European parochialism are more pronounced, and more consequential for Alliance 
relations.  Inevitably the U.S. will devote relatively more attention, effort and resources 
to its commitments elsewhere in the world, where peace has not conspicuously broken 
out; and relatively time and energy less to Europe.
124
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September 2001 only accelerated strategic divergence.  The first major foreign 
attack on U.S. home territory in over 185 years was a watershed.  The response (cast in 
even sharper relief by the torpor or, if you like, restraint of Clinton-era defense policy) 
brought into dramatic effect the American disposition for military activism and for 
unilateralism, with little deference to European sensibilities.
125
   Meanwhile the effect on 
European threat perception and policy was quite limited;
126
 the net result, a further 
widening of the transatlantic gap in strategic perceptions and priorities.
127
  European 
irresolution, exhibited during the Kosovo episode, had already become a spur to 
American unilateralism.
128
  In preparing for serious overseas operations, doubt about the 
military value offered by most European Allies (and the political motives plainly visible 
in their offer
129
) strongly favored U.S. selectivity in the framing of a working coalition.
130
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(3). European Interests Defined by Proximity, and Nearsightedness 
For the U.S., Europe is no longer the lodestar of strategic policy.  In contrast, as 
one commentator put it, “Europe‟s priority is Europe.”131  In a unipolar environment, 
with global public security largely outsourced to the hegemonic ally, the smaller powers 
regard security problems in their immediate neighborhood with far more interest, and 
devote far more attention and energy to them, than problems and threats “of a broader 
strategic, world-order nature,”132 about which they can do relatively little.  European 
interest is fixed chiefly upon regional matters.
133
  The sharp difference in American and 
European policy on Islamist terrorism is but one example.
134
  Another illustration is the 
Western European bias for deployments within the European Continent and region -- in 
the Balkans, and more recently (on a smaller scale) in Lebanon -- rather than in arguably 
more important or volatile zones of conflict.    
The widening transatlantic gap in strategic focus is compounded by the European 
emphasis on “soft power” and multilateralism.  These preferences are largely the 
consequences not of superior wisdom but of inferior military capability; they are 
probably best suited in any case to the unique political conditions of contemporary 
Europe, and have limited application abroad.
135
  As one observer remarks, if American 
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thinking assumes conflict inevitability, self-congratulation about Europe‟s transcendence 
of power rests on “conflict myopia.”136   
 
C. Management of Alliance Risks in Post-Cold War NATO  
Under conditions of unipolarity, then, the alliance dilemma is aggravated for the 
Western European Allies,
137
 especially through increased risk of abandonment by the 
U.S.  The transatlantic divergence in strategic priorities -- intensified by a global U.S. 
campaign against Islamist terrorism, its sponsors, and other dangerous states -- would 
ineluctably dilute American attention to European security.
138
  Indeed it was no longer 
impossible that, in reaction to strategic fatigue or overstretch, the U.S. might disengage 
from Europe, retreating into “homeland sanctuarization” and hemispheric protection at 
the expense of overseas commitments.
139
          
Yet the European members continue to value the Alliance, as an organization 
expressly devoted to European security, and a means of mitigating strategic uncertainties 
linked with the shift to unipolarity.
140
  NATO still responds also to an older uncertainty, 
one obscured by integration‟s rank efflorescence:  the risk of conflict among the Western 
Europeans themselves (discussed in detail below).  While external threats have receded 
and shrunk, NATO remains a hedge against risk, including emergence of new, or 
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renewed, threats.
141
  Alliance with the powerful U.S. has also afforded Europeans 
opportunities to “pass the buck” on matters of concern, if not of vital importance.142   
Continuing interest in the maintenance of the Alliance requires Europeans to find 
means of managing both horns of the dilemma, one of which at least – abandonment – is 
aggravated by unipolarity.  Press-Barnathan argues that to this end they have adopted two 
general strategies:  for entrapment, they have sought to use NATO as a “pact of restraint” 
upon the U.S.; and to mitigate the threat of abandonment, they have pursued a “division 
of labor” with the U.S.143   
(1).  “Pact of Restraint” Strategy  
An alliance serves not only to organize capabilities against threats, but also to 
manage relations among members.  States concerned about domination by a powerful 
leader may attempt to use their alliance as a “pact of restraint,” a vehicle for influence 
through a bargaining process in which they threaten to withhold aid and support, or 
otherwise to penalize actions they disapprove.
144
  Bargaining position may be enhanced 
by coordination among the smaller powers,
145
 but the key is their strategic capability:   
bargaining power varies inversely with alliance dependence, directly with ability to 
withhold from the superpower something it needs.
146
   
In point of fact, Western Europeans have little real difficulty with entrapment, if 
this means the danger of being dragooned into unwilling support for the aims of a 
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hegemonic ally.  It is far from evident that European states move in lockstep with U.S. 
strategic policy – on military sales to China, on Iran‟s nuclear program, on missile 
defense, on Turkish EU candidacy, on defense spending, or on military modernization.  If 
the opposition of France and Germany did not deter U.S. action in Iraq, neither were they 
dragged involuntarily to war; nor were Spanish and Italian withdrawal penalized.
147
  By 
contrast, British support for U.S. policy was grounded in a congruent assessment of the 
Iraqi threat
148
 -- which by definition vitiates entrapment.     
If dependence on the U.S. does not noticeably subject the European Allies to 
entrapment in policies they disapprove, this may be because their measures against the 
danger of abandonment are felt to be effectual.   
(2). “Division of Labor” Strategy 
Post-Cold War divergence of threat perception and strategic priorities is 
constituted, on the European side, by a preference for problems in and near Europe, while 
the U.S. is diverted by commitments and challenges elsewhere.  The concomitant danger 
is that the hegemonic power will not devote the desired energy and resources to 
management of European regional problems.  This points directly to the means to 
mitigate the danger of abandonment:  “regional capabilities to deal with regional security 
threats,” which Press-Barnathan terms a “division of labor” strategy.149   
                                                 
147
      The Allies‟ ability to restrain U.S. policy is to be distinguished from their ability to resist being 
entrapped into supporting it.   
148
      Ibid., p. 303.   
149
      Ibid., p. 285.  See also Press-Barnathan, “The Changing Incentives for Security Regionalization,” p. 
288.  An alternative “division of labor” would entail European specialization in certain kinds of operations, 
such as peacekeeping and stabilization, with the U.S. focusing on power projection and combat.  Heinz 
Gärtner, “European Security After September 11,” International Politics 40, no. 1 (March 2003):  59-73, at 
pp. 59-60.  Online.  ProQuest Research Library.  http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb? index=1&did= 
388489851&SrchMode=3&sid=1&Fmt=6&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=
1257213416&clientId=4463&aid=1.  Accessed on 13 February 2007.  See also de Wijk, “European 
Military Reform for a Global Partnership,” p. 202 (recommending similarly functional “division of labor”).  
 43 
Regional strategic capabilities respond to abandonment in two distinct ways.  
First, they may reduce its probabilistic risk -- the likelihood of its occurrence.  If the U.S. 
values regionally capable European forces for its own purposes, it has a reason to 
maintain Alliance commitments;
150
  or, more to the point, if excessive military weakness 
within Europe might promote U.S. withdrawal, then preservation of defensive capability 
helps avert that result.        
Second, if abandonment should occur, regional capabilities reduce its potential 
impact on Europeans.  The danger pertains, above all, to those security problems that, by 
reason of proximity, and disproportionately regional consequences, are of more concern 
to Europeans than to the global superpower.  Military forces able to handle these 
problems, in the hands of Europeans themselves, reduce their dependence on the U.S., 
and take much of the sting out of the prospect of abandonment.
151
   
(3). “Division of Labor” in Practice via ESDP  
Press-Barnathan‟s analysis emphasizes a collaborative approach to the division of 
labor, through institutional policy integration in the ESDP.
152
  As she demonstrates, a 
lead motive for creating a strategic policy mechanism under the EU aegis was to manage 
the potential cost of abandonment.  The idea of a common EU foreign and security 
policy, anticipated in the early 1990s, gained impetus with the experience of the Balkan 
wars.
153
  European interests, far more than American, were implicated; yet the European 
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response was marked by “ineptitude.”154  The political circumstances of U.S. intervention 
in Bosnia and Kosovo cast doubt on prospects for similar action in the future, feeding 
new concern over abandonment,
155
 and prompting new convergence among European 
powers in favor of independent EU capability.
156
  Hence the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty‟s 
enhanced policy mechanisms, and the Helsinki Conference‟s “headline goals” for 
military assets.
157
  Its framers intended ESDP to serve as a vehicle to assemble European 
coalitions of the willing, to back EU policies with military options where U.S. interests 
were not engaged.
158
  It was to be the institutional and collaborative embodiment of a 
division-of-labor strategy, reducing potential abandonment costs through autonomous 
capabilities to meet regional problems.     
 Yet ESDP remains underweight, in relation to Europe‟s security requirements, 
and to the consequences of abandonment.  Only very limited forces are at the EU‟s 
disposal, and only for low-intensity operations:  it can at present field, on short notice, 
only two “battlegroups” of 1500-2200 troops, for crisis management and similar duties.  
It undertakes no guarantee of members‟ independence and territorial integrity, and it has 
no mechanism for organizing collective defense against major threats.
159
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 More fundamentally, ESDP‟s military capability is inherently potential and ad 
hoc.  Potential, since all forces and equipment earmarked to it remain under authority of 
the contributing state, and may be withheld from any proposed operation.
160
  Ad hoc,
161
 
because it omits any formal, binding ex ante commitment to military cooperation.
162
  Any 
action requires a process of interstate consultation and coordination, aimed not only at 
procuring unanimous consent, but also at assembling a “coalition of the willing” to 
contribute the requisite military means.  Hence ESDP is “perennially contingent.”163  The 
uncertainties of the political effort in any discrete case
164
 imply a measure of policy risk 
for EU members interested in the problem at hand.  Even if consensus can be achieved, 
the process would take time,
165
 impeding the prompt response often indispensable to 
effective crisis management.
166
   
The ESDP project is incomplete.  It still exists primarily on paper,
167
 and its future 
trajectory and velocity are uncertain.
168
  As a shield against abandonment, it remains a 
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skeletal framework, with limited reach and impact.  This is not to suggest that the effort is 
wasted, or insincere.  Yet EU members pursue it while maintaining large and well-
established territorial defense armies under their own sovereign control.           
What is indispensable to a division-of-labor policy is not institutional integration, 
nor collaboration (necessary as it may be in a crisis), but “regional capabilities to deal 
with regional security threats.”  If European military power has limited global impact, in 
its home region it is more significant.  European national forces, indeed, constitute the 
leading countermeasure against strategic abandonment by the U.S.   
(4). Maintenance of Territorial Defense Forces as Division-of-Labor Strategy 
 The motive elucidated by Press-Barnathan for pursuit of ESDP – as a means to 
limit the effects of a potential U.S. abandonment of NATO – is even more persuasive in 
explaining continuity in the individual states‟ force structures.  Maintenance of large 
militaries, under state control, primarily configured for territorial defense but also capable 
of response to local and regional challenges, represents the most substantial (if less 
acknowledged) means for the European Allies to deal with U.S. strategic neglect or 
retrenchment.  This policy serves in one respect to control the likelihood of abandonment, 
in others to minimize its potential costs.  It is wholly within state competency; it labors 
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under no unanimity (or even multilateralism) rule; it supports national sovereignty 
interests, and welfare-state priorities discussed below.  Above all, it is functionally 
congruent with the proximity-driven security concerns of European states.   
(a). European Land Armies Essential to Alliance Defense 
The Allies‟ substantial territorial defense forces help limit the probability of 
abandonment by the U.S.  NATO‟s guarantee of European security has always rested on 
two foundations:  substantial European armies, to bear the brunt of initial resistance 
against attack; and tangible assurance of a timely, effective transatlantic reinforcement by 
the U.S.  The latter would be difficult, even impossible, without the former:  defeat in 
Europe would leave nothing to reinforce, and nowhere to reinforce it.  Were NATO 
European military forces too far diminished, in size and defensive capability, the U.S. 
reinforcement role would be rendered futile.  Anticipatory realization of this futility 
would likely spell the end of U.S. commitment to NATO -- an outcome avoided through 
preservation of European defense forces at some level of perceived adequacy.      
Throughout the Cold War, NATO‟s conventional forces in Europe, composed 
predominantly of European armies, must manage the initial response to any crisis, while 
preserving the threat of continued escalation.
169
  As the offshore maritime superpower, 
the U.S. provided Europe with “crucial strategic depth.”170  Its forces stationed in Europe 
would participate in the initial defense, but more importantly served to reassure friends, 
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and to warn the enemy, that any attack would set in motion the full weight of U.S. power, 
committed from the outset, if delayed in operational engagement.
171
   
U.S. relief of an initial, mainly European, defense was and remains central to 
NATO strategy against any major threat to Western Europe.
172
  Since the end of the Cold 
War, conventional threats have diminished and retreated; they have not disappeared.
173
  
There remains concern about Russia,
174
 not least because of the temptations presented for 
Russian intervention by Eastern European instability.
175
  With a lower profile, NATO is 
still the basis for European security against aggression, external or otherwise; its keystone 
is still the U.S. as offshore strategic anchor, and guarantor against deterioration of the 
strategic environment.
176
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The U.S. guarantee rests on its promise of transatlantic intervention in case of 
attack.
177
  Without significant European defensive power, however, this promise would 
be eviscerated.  As one commentator has said of defense in Northern Europe:  “If the 
Nordic countries want help from other countries including NATO members, they must be 
able to hold off the enemy at least long enough for that help to arrive.”178  This was and is 
true for all of NATO Europe.  Its task at the outset of major conflict is to mobilize 
sufficient forces, including large reserve elements, to resist attack and to hold key 
territory until arrival of the relief.
179
  Should Europe fail in this, intervention by follow-on 
U.S. forces would be problematic at best.  U.S. deployment would require a broad 
logistical bridgehead – ports, road and rail links, large-volume airfields.  Effective 
counter-offensive by maneuver would require retention of large portions of the mainland 
north of the Alps.  Without these, American intervention might be not just difficult, 
costly, and delayed; it might prove impossible or ultimately futile.         
Excessive reduction of Western European defense capabilities would make this 
futility a real risk for the U.S.; no conceivable European policy would be more likely to 
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provoke U.S. abrogation of the mutual defense guarantee -- or at least a withdrawal of 
American forces, that would make intervention both more difficult and more optional.
180
  
To avoid this, European NATO states must maintain armed forces at levels not obviously 
inadequate, in light of current and potential near-term conditions, for a serious initial 
defensive effort.
181
   
(b). Territorial Defense Forces for Local and Regional Security  
 European defense forces are essential, then, to limit the chance that abandonment 
will occur.  Through the functions they would assume in the event of U.S. abandonment, 
the same forces also limit its potential costs.  Abandonment cost mitigation requires a 
state to possess or assemble the means to provide for its own security requirements, 
without reliance on the possibly wayward ally.  For European NATO states, the critical 
requirement is for “regional capabilities . . . to deal with regional security threats.”182  
Each has at hand an instrument of long-standing substance, under its exclusive 
authority,
183
 suited to local and regional action:  its own sovereign military forces. 
                                                 
180
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 European armies in general still adhere to a territorial defense configuration.
184
  
Capable of occasional small-scale “over-the-horizon” peacekeeping and similar actions, 
they cannot conduct major independent deployments to remote combat theaters.
185
  In the 
Bosnia and Kosovo peacekeeping missions, their effectiveness rested on geographical 
proximity; in effect, they are tethered to Europe and its immediate periphery.
186
    
As this implies, proximity magnifies capability.  Europe‟s sealift shortage is 
mitigated by territorial contiguity (except in parts of the periphery); regional air transport 
would require fewer aircraft than inter-continental operations, since distances and 
turnaround times are far shorter.  Territorial defense force structures, emphasizing 
manpower, armor, and interceptor and strike aircraft, would support a broad spectrum of 
interventions within the European region, including combat operations
187
 against the full 
range of potential adversaries.
188
  Regional non-combat operations likewise suit the 
manpower-intensive European armies.  Peacekeeping and crisis response demand boots 
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on the ground more than firepower -- labor for emergency relief work, a large and visible 
armed presence for security.
189
  Such operations, moreover, may entail prolonged 
engagement, likewise placing a premium on troop strength for deployment rotations.
190
        
The national forces of Western Europe enjoy a crucial advantage over ESDP‟s 
military arm, in that they exist:  they are not ad hoc and contingent, but have established 
institutional being, stand in clearly defined relation to civilian authority, are woven into 
the political and economic fabric of states, and retain considerable physical substance in 
peacetime.  Nor are the national armies subject to ESDP‟s limitations of scale and scope; 
the EU‟s nominal 13 battlegroups would be brought to full complement by less than 2.5 
percent of Western European NATO active-duty manpower.  And the states hold sole 
command authority over their armies:  with the exception of Germany, in case of need 
they can undertake military action without an intergovernmental political or coalition-
building process.  With or without EU consensus, the several states‟ forces form the real 
basis for action, in coalition or otherwise, to address regional security problems.     
Two qualifications are appropriate.  First, European emphasis on territorial 
defense is not wholly exclusive.  It is compatible with limited expeditionary capabilities, 
and occasional, limited multilateral actions beyond the European region; for example, the 
deployment of small contingents by several Continental states to Afghanistan and Iraq.
191
  
                                                 
189
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operations in Kosovo, European states provided majority of peacekeeping forces there);  Shepherd, 
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Second, European capabilities even for territorial defense and regional security are 
limited.  Yet even at low levels, they suffice for abandonment mitigation, under 
contemporary conditions – with NATO, and with the U.S. commitment still anchored by 
forces on the Continent.  Were the U.S. to withdraw its forces or to abrogate the North 
Atlantic Treaty, a commensurate increase in European defense spending and regional 
military capabilities would be likely, if not inevitable.    
To the extent capable of national self-defense, and of action to maintain stability 
in and about the Continent, European NATO states avoid a hazardous dependence on 
Americans for vindication of their most immediate and accepted strategic interests.  By 
the same means, they protect themselves against the effects of strategic abandonment by 
the U.S. -- whether in abstention from specific action, or generalized inattention to 
European interests, or a wholesale transatlantic re-embarkation.  Maintenance of 
Europe‟s long-standing territorial defense armies thus serves a division-of-labor strategy.   
Further, by reducing the potential impact of abandonment, these forces limit the 
threat of entrapment in U.S. policy.  The more they can dispense with U.S. assistance in 
addressing their leading priorities, the more readily Europeans can refuse to conform to 
American preferences.  The efficacy of this strategy is suggested by the exceptionally 
limited gravitational pull of U.S. policy on the Western European Allies.   
In sum, NATO Europe maintains seemingly anachronistic force structures for the 
primary military purpose
192
 of limiting the prospective ill effects of strategic neglect or 
retrenchment by the U.S.  Among other evidence for this is the widely recognized – 
though, in capability, far less substantial -- pursuit of ESDP to the same end.  National 
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territorial defense armies remain the essential means to survive both the possible decline 
of NATO, and the possible deadlock or breakdown of ESDP. 
(c). European Armies Essential to Stability in a Post-NATO Europe  
In the event of radical strategic abandonment by the U.S. -- withdrawal from 
NATO, or withdrawal of American forces from Europe -- Western Europeans must 
defend against external aggression and manage regional security problems.  They would 
also have to resume full responsibility, without external support, for the preservation of 
peace within Europe, among themselves.     
(i). Internal Stabilization Role of the Alliance 
NATO‟s initial impetus, and most obvious Cold War function, was to organize 
members‟ military capabilities for effective deterrence and defense against Soviet power 
(itself a sustaining influence for NATO cohesion).
193
  Yet even in the bipolar era this was 
not all.  NATO also imposed peace among the European Allies and facilitated a 
reordering, without modern precedent, of the relations among them.  The mutual defense 
commitment under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty,
194
 and the American promise of 
intervention, were not limited to “external” threats.  They applied implicitly also to 
aggression by any member against another.  As the framework for “structural peace” in 
Europe,
195
 NATO essentially eliminated the risk of war among the Allies.
196
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Sheltered against the hazards that feed mutual distrust, the European states could 
pursue cooperative relations.  As John Mearsheimer explained, NATO‟s security 
guarantee mitigated relative-gains concerns among Allies (“who will gain more?”),197 
thereby greatly expanding the potential range of interstate collaboration.  NATO enabled 
members to abandon (at least suspend) strategic rivalry; cemented their renunciation of 
territorial grievances; and facilitated economic and political integration.
198
  It also solved 
the “German problem,” framing a secure position at the heart of the Continent for a state 
both intrinsically powerful and geographically vulnerable, without resumption of 
militarized nationalism.
199
  The Alliance‟s combination of supports and constraints was 
essential to a German reunification that neighbors might otherwise have found 
threatening.
200
  And in Eastern Europe, keeping peace among neighbors (many with 
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could remain a full NATO member”); see also Dominique Moisi, “Europe‟s Map, Compass and Horizon,” 
Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January 1995):  122-134, at p. 130.  Online.  Military & Government Collection.  
http://libdb.sjfc.edu:2500/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=950
1254894&site=ehost-live&scope=site.  Accessed on 17 April 2007 (NATO is a “central element[] of 
Germany‟s raison d’état,” essential to prevent its neighbors and partners “from envisaging coalitions to 
balance and contain its demographic, economic, and political . . . weight”).   
 56 
latent but enduring territorial and other disputes) has been a powerful motive for adhesion 
to the Alliance.
201
  In short, NATO has solved the security problem in Europe.
202
  
This is the core of its contemporary significance.  François Heisbourg wrote in 
1992 that “Western Europe has to guard against the risk of a return to „la géopolitique de 
grand‟papa‟,” or old-style geopolitics -- a reversion to the national strategic policies, a 
resumption of the contest for national power, that marked most of Europe‟s modern 
history.
203
  The European states share a fundamental interest in averting such regression, 
through maintenance of multilateral defense arrangements.
204
  With ESDP in an uncertain 
infancy, NATO is the basis for defense collaboration.
205
  As a system of reassurance and 
restraint through deterrence, NATO has prevented aggression among its members; as a 
system of support through mutual assured defense, it has obviated a potentially 
destabilizing renationalization of security.   
In both respects, its efficacy is founded on U.S. participation.  NATO formalizes, 
embodies and “cements” the U.S. commitment to Western Europe.206  Western European 
acceptance of security dependence on the U.S. was essential to the postwar European 
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order,
207
 since the degree of cooperation achieved was possible only with the U.S. as 
“ultimate arbiter” in the alliance system.208  Only the assurance of intra-European 
peace
209
 and of each Ally‟s independence and territorial integrity, through the promise of 
intervention against any aggressor, made by an offshore superpower stronger than any of 
them (or indeed any coalition of them), could suffice to overcome their previously 
endemic rivalry.
210
  Only under this strategic shelter could Western Europeans “pursue[] 
their new order, freed from the brutal laws and even the mentality of power politics.”211   
Yet beneath the public self-assurance of Europe‟s liberal internationalism lies a 
dormant uncertainty.  By themselves, Western Europeans have not been notably effective 
in producing collective goods such as mutual defense or political unity, even in the 
shadow of Soviet aggression.
212
  They have relied heavily on the U.S. as “the great 
organizer”213 (as well as the preeminent bearer of public security burdens).  The 
uncertainty, then, is whether European integration and cooperation would have self-
sustaining momentum in the absence of external support.  If war in Western Europe is 
today “unthinkable,” this is because the U.S., through NATO, has made it so.  The 
reluctance of European states to hand over to the EU any real authority over foreign and 
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military policy suggests that political and economic integration remain the superstructure 
-- are not the foundation -- of a durable European peace.  Whether the widely advertised 
European transcendence of power can stand on its own, without “insurance underwritten 
by the United States,” remains therefore an open question.214 
  (ii). U.S. Withdrawal and National Military Power 
Were the U.S. to abandon NATO, this uncertainty would cease to be dormant; 
indeed it would become an exigent policy challenge.  Together with the necessity of 
preparing for potential threats, it would tend to promote a remilitarization of national 
policy
215
 and a renationalization of military policy in Western Europe.  In particular, 
withdrawal of the unipolar American power would remove the chief material barrier to 
resumption of strategic competition among the Western European Allies themselves.   
As Germany achieved reunification, a position from which it might also attain 
Continental preeminence, France and Britain were in a gradual relative decline, and Italy 
adrift under leftist (and other) governments.
216
  It is significant that Europeans, especially 
French and Germans, are not fully confident in the “German problem‟s” permanent 
resolution.
217
  Nor, without NATO, has Germany‟s French-and-Russian problem been 
solved in any permanent sense.  Under la géopolitique de grand’papa, German power 
must suffice to protect it against a combination of hostile neighbors; that power would in 
turn be a worry to others, who must “combine against it, as they have . . . before.”218   
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      Ibid., p. 110.  
215
      Kaiser, “Reforming NATO,” p. 129.   
216
      Joffe, “„Bismarck or Britain‟?” p. 112.  Italy has been described as “a big country that behaves like a 
small one.”  Lindley-French, “In the Shade of Locarno?” p. 794.    
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      Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” p. 17.     
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      Smyser, “Dateline Berlin:  Germany‟s New Vision,” p. 153.   
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No one would desire a reappearance in Europe of the multipolar strategic system 
of 1914.  Yet -- obscured as it may be by integration, by NATO defense, and by the 
fashionable aspirations of liberal internationalism -- European security is nevertheless 
“founded upon a balance of power”219 stabilized by U.S. preeminence.  It is instructive to 
observe, for example, the consistency with which French military strength has been held 
closely in line with that of Germany, despite an appreciably smaller population and 
GDP.
220
  So long as war between them is essentially impossible, this French policy 
presumably serves to maintain a balance with the Berlin Republic in the hard-power basis 
for political influence within Europe.     
Thus, with the U.S. in position as anchor of European security.  In case of 
American withdrawal, one would expect a general and more pronounced trend toward 
interest and investment in the devices of power.  Even without resumption of nineteenth-
century power politics -- even with a stronger EU, perhaps as successor to NATO in 
organizing a common defense -- armed forces under state control would assume greater 
significance, as Europeans assumed plenary responsibility for the stability of their 
Continent.  Military capabilities would be vital resources in intra-European policy 
formation, in the forging of bargains on common security problems.  And if, on the other 
hand, after withdrawal of the American deus ex machina
221
 a cooperative environment 
should not prevail, tendencies to rearmament and renationalization would be still 
stronger; for state power would then face urgent demands.    
                                                 
219
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220
      Since the early 1990s, French military spending has (until quite recently) exceeded Germany‟s --  
sustained by a national GDP three-quarters the size.  French forces have been kept within about ten percent 
of German active-duty strength -- despite France‟s military professionalization, and a population about 75 
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      Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” p. 16.  
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These possibilities lie in an uncertain future.  Meanwhile, the territorial defense 
armies of Western Europe serve as a hedge for each state against instability in the wake 
of a U.S. withdrawal, and as a basis for the exercise of influence in the negotiation of 
each state‟s position in a post-NATO Europe.   
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V. SOCIO-ECONOMIC POLICY PRIORITIES 
Faced with no proximate existential threat, enjoying general peace and order 
among themselves, the Western European states‟ chief function – and their electorates‟ 
leading demand – is the provision of social welfare and other public benefits, and the 
management of economic stability.  This priority exerts its own influence on defense 
spending and force structure.   
   
A. Primacy of Social Welfare, and Zero-Sum Game with Defense Spending 
The priority for social welfare is deeply rooted in the postwar European order.  To 
deal with social and political tensions accompanying reconstruction, industrialization and 
urbanization, and to manage challenges to the consolidation of political liberalism, the 
Western European states adopted deliberate (and widely supported) policies of 
redistribution and social spending.
222
  State provision of a wide array of benefits and 
services is entrenched in public preferences:  Europeans expect income supports, 
restrictive labor policies, extensive unemployment insurance, free or subsidized health 
care and university education, media, and transportation services.
223
  Indeed, the term 
“welfare state” was coined to describe the predominant role of modern European 
government
224
 -- socio-economic and quality-of-life guarantees for constituents.
225
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2002):  51-66, at pp. 52-53.  Online.  Military & Government Collection.  http://libdb.sjfc.edu:2500/login? 
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Data on European public spending are illustrative.  Among EU members in 2004, 
70 percent of state expenditures went to public benefit programs such as education, 
health, housing, recreation and culture, and “social protection”226 – functions that (unlike 
road-building, law enforcement, and defense) involve neither public goods nor collective 
action problems, but are essentially redistributive.  Among Western European NATO 
states, public spending (net of defense) in 2006 ranged between a low 37.2 and a high of 
51 percent of GDP, with most values in the mid and upper 40‟s.227   
In the near term, state spending is largely a zero-sum game between mutually 
exclusive priorities.  Expenditure of public resources on defense means withholding them 
from other, more popular purposes.  One implication of the dominant welfare priority is 
that, since the end of the Cold War, the Western European Allies have consistently fallen 
short of U.S. defense spending as a percentage of GDP.
228
  Only the U.K. and France 
have exceeded two-thirds the U.S. level in even part of this period; and almost across the 
board European defense spending has been in decline.  
                                                                                                                                                 
url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=7288179&site=ehost-live&scope 
=site.  Accessed 13 February 2007 (modern European state comparatively less important as source of 
national identity, provider of physical security).   
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      See Appendix B, p. 5.   
227
      See Appendix B, p. 5.  U.S. non-defense public spending was at 30.6 percent of GDP.     
228
      The following is a summary tabulation of military spending as a percentage of GDP during the 
sample years.   See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Information on Defence Expenditures,” 
http://www.nato.int/issues/defence_expenditures/index.html.  Accessed on 24 March 2009.            
U.S. U.K. Fr. Ger. It. Sp. Ne. Bel. Den. Nor. Port. 
2007 4.0 2.5 2.4 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.5 
2004 4.0 2.2 2.6 1.4 2.0 1.2 1.5 1.2 1.5 1.9 1.6 
00-04 3.4 2.3 2.5 1.4 2.0 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.9 1.7 
95-99 3.3 2.7 2.9 1.6 1.9 1.3 1.8 1.5 1.7 2.2 2.1 
90-94 4.6 3.7 3.3 2.1 2.0 1.6 2.3 1.9 1.9 2.8 2.4 
 
Germany, the largest economy in Europe, is among the most parsimonious with its military.  Further, 
“defense” expenditures as calculated by NATO for France, Italy (up to 2007) and Spain are overstated by 
inclusion of outlays for their large paramilitary police organizations (103,000 Gendarmerie; 107,000 
Carabinieri; and 73,000 Guardia Civil).  See The Military Balance 2009, p. 447.   
 63 
The disfavored position of defense spending is reinforced by two other factors:  
the absence of a publicly appreciated strategic exigency; and the availability of public 
security goods provided and paid for by others.  Under these conditions, asking voters to 
forego public benefits in favor of defense entails a task of persuasion beyond the reach of 
most politicians.  Governments responsible to electorates predictably favor domestic 
priorities,
229
 and without a visible near-term threat, a significant shift toward military 
spending is politically improbable.
230
     
The zero-sum game, with the deck stacked against the military, has been a long-
standing constraint on European power.  In the 1980s the European Allies, faced with 
possible U.S. redeployment in case of a Persian Gulf contingency, recognized the need, 
and even promised, to build up their logistics capabilities and reserve forces.  Subsequent 
“inability” to perform this undertaking is attributed to the non-negotiable welfare 
priority.
231
  More recently, refusal to increase military spending at the expense of welfare 
programs has impeded force modernization programs.
232
   
The preference for welfare, however, also influences the allocation of funds 
within defense budgets.  Without imminent war-fighting needs, elements of military 
spending perceived to advance welfare priorities attain a favored position.     
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B. European Socio-Economic Priorities Reflected in Military Spending and 
Force Structure  
 
(1). European Military Spending is Biased Toward Personnel Expenditures  
Welfare-state influence on defense budgets favors certain forms of spending, and 
thereby influences force structure itself.  Specifically, it promotes a continued priority for 
manpower, or “consumption” spending, over “investment” in weapons, technology, and 
logistical assets.
233
    
Cold War conventional defense required manpower, in the form of large conscript 
armies based almost entirely on home territory – a necessity that constrained the 
investment components of defense spending.  The Continental Allies have maintained 
this pattern since the end of the Cold War,
234
 as shown by NATO data for members‟ 
defense spending allocations, including the proportion for “personnel”235 (see Appendix 
B, p. 6).  In 1990-1994, the U.S. averaged 39.3 percent, joining the U.K (42.2 percent) 
and Norway (40.6) at the low end.  The Continental states (with no data for France
236
) 
applied substantially greater proportions of defense funds to manpower:   
‟90-‟94 Ger. Italy Spain Neth. Bel. Den. Port. 
Percent: 57.4 63.6 64.9 56.9 68.3 57.5 77.3    
2008 NATO estimates show the U.S. percentage down to 29.9, with the U.K. (40.7 
percent) and Norway (42.2 percent) next.  Other European states significantly prefer 
personnel spending:          
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2008 Fr. Ger. Italy Spain Neth. Bel. Den. Port. 
%(est) 56.9 53.6 73.5 53.7 50.9 72.5 49 71.7 
Against the contrary U.S. trend, and with the reduced physical scale of European armies 
since the mid-1990s, the persistent tendency is striking.
237
   
This bias, together with the gap in spending as a share of GDP, has magnified the 
transatlantic capabilities divergence.  Then-Defense Secretary William Cohen remarked 
in 2000 that European NATO states “spend roughly 60 per cent of what the United States 
does, and they get about 10 per cent of the capability.”238  Allowing something for 
hyperbole, and something for the metrics of “capability,” the point is beyond dispute that 
military power is not the sole object of European military spending.  Force structures for 
territorial defense and regional action do serve the primarily local security priorities of 
NATO Europe.  At the same time, these force structures are under strong influence from 
the political consensus favoring social welfare, an influence independent of strategic and 
security considerations.   
(2). European Militaries as Providers of Employment and Public Benefits 
Threat management is not the sole “functional imperative” of armed forces; they 
can also serve significant domestic socio-political purposes.
239
  The symbolism of 
sovereignty is one.  Otherwise, in Western Europe, non-strategic functions are limited,
240
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with one exception:  armed forces are a major “parallel or substitute provider of state 
goods,” including public employment and associated benefits.241  
(a).  Military Employment -- Uniformed Personnel   
A large military payroll affords both a supplement and an alternative to the 
private sector, and to civilian public-sector employment.  Armed forces serve, in part, as 
employment programs – to keep participants occupied in a publicly accepted function, 
while providing them a stable income.  European states hence often prefer to maintain 
active-duty personnel on the payroll, rather than to divert limited funds to modernization 
or acquisition programs.
242
   
Employment maintenance, if not necessarily inconsistent with military needs, is 
autonomous of them.  Its significance as a policy motive is illustrated, moreover, by other 
personnel practices, common in Western Europe, that do compromise military 
requirements.  For example, in some states, military pay is tied directly to the salary 
regime for civilian public-sector workers, with a deeply ingrained priority for “equity” 
between them.
243
  Since civilian state employees are typically under the authority of 
powerful unions, the equity principle limits the responsiveness of military payroll
244
 to 
functional considerations peculiar to the armed services, such as retention rates, training 
and expertise, and deployment experience; or, for that matter, physical capability.   
Many members of the Western European armed forces are represented by labor 
associations that approximate trade unions.
245
  Even those not quasi-unionized generally 
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enjoy the same highly restrictive employment protections applicable to the private sector, 
with the result that many professional soldiers “expect to serve for a lifetime, whether or 
not the services need them.”246  Employee protections, together with generous military 
pension plans, have favored retention of older personnel, and impeded recruitment of the 
young.
247
  After force reductions in the mid-1990‟s, for example, the Belgian Army was 
notable for forty-seven-year-old corporals and an average service duration of thirty-eight 
years -- neither especially favoring combat readiness.
248
 
 As Williams remarks, “what sounds to a Western European like reasonable equity 
and career stability can sound to an American like a jobs program.”249  Indeed it does.     
  (b).  Military Employment of Civilians  
The employment function of the military is illustrated also by the significant 
contingents of non-combatant civilian staff maintained by most Western European armed 
forces.  According to figures published in early 2008, the French Defense Ministry had 
approximately 79,000 civilian employees (for about 250,000 active-duty military 
personnel); Germany, about 117,000 (as of 2006, with active-duty forces then about 
284,000); Italy, roughly 35,000 (for about 185,000); and Portugal, nearly 10,000 (for 
43,000).
250
  A British Defence Ministry report of 2009 cites roughly 76,000 full-time  
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employees (exclusive of “locally engaged civilians” overseas).251   
A problem encountered in German military reform efforts suggests the 
implications of heavy civilian employment.
252
  A proposal floated in 2000 would have 
closed roughly half of Germany‟s military installations and bases, to save funds and 
improve military efficiency through facility consolidation.
253
  Expected effects on local 
civilian employment,
254
 however, provoked significant opposition.
255
  Citing “local 
economic and social factors,” the Defense Ministry scaled back the plan, ultimately to 
reach fewer than ten percent of its facilities.
256
  The anecdote is not cited to suggest that 
German policy is uniquely influenced by civilian employment interests:  this is to be 
suspected in any state that both possesses a large complement of civilian defense 
employees, and largely refrains from the operational deployments that may necessitate 
reliance on civilians for domestic support functions.
257
   
(c).  Military Compensation -- Overlap with Public Benefits 
Military pay and benefits substitute for a portion of generally available civilian 
welfare and unemployment programs that the state would otherwise provide.  Indeed, the 
overlap between them is so substantial that (in contrast to the U.S.) military recruiting in 
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Europe is typically not advantaged by deteriorating economic conditions and higher 
unemployment.
258
  “Western European social safety nets [support] people who in the 
United States would see military service as an alternative to unemployment. . . .”259    
Among other typical benefits are policies favoring military families, including 
subsidized housing, child care, and efforts to “reduce family separations.”260  Useful as 
incentives for recruiting and retention, they also tend to encourage early marriage and 
child-bearing.  This may not always serve interests of military readiness,
261
 in terms of 
individual soldier deployability, availability for training, morale and unit cohesion.      
By way of a final example, German conscription policy offers alternatives to 
military service, and thereby affords a significant side “benefit” for the state:  a large 
body of conscientious objectors provides inexpensive (if also unskilled) labor in support 
of the social welfare system.
262
  Reluctance to forego this labor pool aided the successful 
opposition to Defence Ministry conscription reform proposals.
263
   
 
C. Spending Priorities Favor Territorial Defense Force Structure  
 In the policies shaping contemporary European force structure and defense 
budgets, military effectiveness is not the sole consideration.  Public expectations and the 
state‟s commitment to social welfare priorities weigh heavily in the allocation of defense 
funds.  Hence, among the military‟s practical functions is to provide stable employment,  
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salaries, and benefits that, in part, substitute for other welfare-state programs.  This is 
evident in the marked preference among Western European militaries for expenditure on 
personnel and “consumption,” rather than on arms, equipment and power projection 
resources.   
Meanwhile, the leading strategic concern for NATO‟s European members is to 
prepare for potential abandonment by the U.S., whether in the form of abstention from 
particular security problems or a generalized withdrawal.  Limiting the potential damage 
from such eventualities requires certain military capabilities:  for territorial defense, to 
preserve state sovereignty; and for regional action to manage those problems that, by 
reason of proximity, implicate regional security.  It does not require the means for global 
strategic action.    
At the confluence of these imperatives lies the contemporary European force 
structure.  It is a lineal descendant of its Cold War progenitor, albeit on a reduced scale; 
heavily weighted toward manpower, and to the facilities, weapons and capabilities of 
territorial defense; and, for the most part, incapable of action beyond the immediate 
environs of Europe.   
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VI. CONCLUSION 
I have argued that three significant strands of policy inform the continued 
preference of the Western European NATO states for large territorial defense militaries.  
Of the two elements falling within the broad category of strategic policy, the first is the 
more general:  that a state‟s independence rests ultimately on its ability to use force in 
defense of its vital interests, or to contribute materially to common defense by a coalition.  
The relationship is of such long standing that military power has become a symbol of 
sovereignty.  In a Europe at peace, the symbolism may seem more relevant than the 
substance.  But the makers of policy -- to whom all possible futures are perforce 
uncertain -- are reluctant to relinquish the hard instruments of power that would be 
needed to vindicate territorial integrity and political independence against armed threat.    
 This first factor is generic, bearing (presumably) upon the policy of almost any 
state.  By contrast, the alliance security dilemma pertains to members of a mutual defense 
alliance; it is particularly important for the European members of post-Cold War NATO.  
Strategic abandonment by the preeminent transatlantic Ally reentered the realm of 
possibility with the end of the Cold War, with the emergence of the U.S. as a unipolar 
power, and with the prevalence of peace in Europe.  This danger demands measures both 
to diminish its likelihood and to control its prospective consequences.  To avert a U.S. 
withdrawal premised on the futility of Alliance defense, the Western European Allies 
must possess adequate defense forces.  In case the U.S. should withdraw or, more likely, 
decline to act on a regional problem, the Europeans must hold regional strategic 
capabilities.  Finally, a full U.S. withdrawal would end the offshore great-power 
guarantee of European peace, and would test the resilience and momentum of European 
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integration by removing a crucial barrier to resumption of competitive politics in Europe.  
Whether in a self-sustaining and free-standing Union, or with its disintegration, European 
states would need military power -- ultimately, to preserve their own independence.  The 
one policy that meets each of these demands is for states to maintain substantial military 
forces, armed and organized principally for territorial defense.     
The third factor, exogenous to strategic policy, nonetheless strongly influences it:  
the primacy of welfare in the allocation of public resources.  Spending on manpower-
intensive territorial defense armies is congruent with the priorities, and complementary 
with the programs, of the social welfare system.  Alternative forms of expenditure, 
especially on force modernization and power projection capabilities, are not.   
These three positive policy influences contribute to the persistence in Western 
Europe of force structures remarkably consistent with the Cold War model – built chiefly 
for territorial defense, and substantially non-deployable.   
There are also, however, what might be termed “negative” influences, in that they 
tend to impede movement toward an alternative strategic orientation and force structure.   
One is summed up in the exploitation thesis:  that, with the unipolar superpower more or 
less consistently providing the global public security goods that Western Europeans find 
useful, there is little reason for them either to duplicate or to contribute to American 
efforts beyond Europe.  Further, the loss of almost all significant overseas possessions 
dramatically reduced the state-specific “private” goods that, in a remote past, gave 
European states reasons for strategic action abroad.    
A second constraint is indicated by Kagan‟s “capabilities” thesis:  that the gap in 
military power between Europe and the U.S. has occasioned development of genuinely 
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divergent ways of perceiving threats and of formulating responses to them.  Europeans, in 
general, are less disposed to use power, more inclined to the processes of collaboration 
and integration that have so strikingly marked (recent) European history.  Here, too, a 
major cause is to be found in history:  the destruction wrought by World War II, and the 
weakened condition of Europe in its aftermath, from which American strategic dynamism 
took an early and still unchallenged lead.       
These changes in turn took root in political culture -- in widely held, if often 
implicit, expectations conditioning the role and power of the state.  Disproportionate U.S. 
capability and activity; Europe‟s retreat from empire, and inability to undertake a major 
overseas role in the containment of Communist aggression; absorption in the broadening 
and deepening of European integration – all have contributed to strategic insularity as a 
habit of thought and a way of life.  Europe has not embraced a successor to empire as a 
rationale for serious global engagement.  Instead, much of its “modern history has been 
spent adjusting to the notion” that it need not be concerned with “quarrels [among] 
peoples of faraway countries about which Europeans know nothing. . . .”264     
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&db=mth&AN=22304099&site=ehost-live&scope=site.  Accessed on 21 December 2008.         
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Appendix A:  Forces  Deployed or Stationed Abroad 
Global (excluding forces in W.E. NATO states)    [troops abroad within W.E. NATO] 
 
  Numbers  % of A.D. Forces      % of Depl. Forces in Balkans 
1990 – 1991265         
US 161,000 [308,000]      7.6 %    [ 14.5%]  NA 
UK 22,000    [67,200]      7.2%     [ 22% ]  NA  
Fr 32,000    [55,400]      6.9%     [ 12.0% ]  NA 
Ger [naval detachment, Med.]      [      ]          NA 
It 177         0.045          NA 
Sp 10,064         3.7              NA 
Ne 650       [5700]      0.63       [ 5.6% ]  NA 
Bel     0   [24,900]      0            [ 27.1% ]  NA 
Den  384         1.2              NA 
Nor 953         2.8              NA 
Port    0                0                 NA  
 
1996 – 1997    
US 150,000 [111,000]      9.7        [ 7.2 ]  16.3% 
UK 25,000  [29,000]     10.4       [ 12.1 ]  42.0 
Fr 39,000  [15,000]      9.5        [ 3.7 ]  19.2 
Ger 5100         1.5         78.4 
It 2500         0.76            88.0 
Sp 1700         0.83            82.4   W.E. total  
Ne 3500  [3400]       4.7          [ 4.6 ]  57.1   in Balkans: 
Bel 1240  [2000]       2.6          [ 4.2 ]  99.1         37.8% 
Den                  Excl. UK: 
Nor 1650         5.5          53.8        36% 
Port  1250         2.3          72  
 
2002 – 2003     
US 148,000 [104,000]      10.8        [ 7.6 ]    5.4% 
UK 16,000  [17,700]       7.6         [ 8.4 ]  24.4 
Fr 32,000  [3000]       11.7        [ 1.1 ]  23.1 
Ger 8500           2.8         76.5 
It 6500  [93]         2.8        [ 0.04 ]   89.2 
Sp 3050           2.1              82.0 W.E. total 
Ne 4130  [2680]         8.2        [ 5.3 ]  76.3 in Balkans: 
Bel 1475  [2000]         3.7        [ 5.1 ]  84.5         41.0% 
Den  1210           5.7   74.8 Excl. UK: 
Nor 1165           4.4   94.4        49.2% 
Port  1425           3.3   45.0         
                                                 
265
      Excludes deployments for Persian Gulf War, noted infra.    
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Global (excl. W.E. NATO)  [troops stationed abroad within W.E. NATO] 
     Numbers           % of Active-Duty Forces         % of Depl. Forces in Balkans 
 
2005 - 2006 
 
US 325,000    [103,500]      25.2%     [ 8.0% ]   0.89%  
UK 20,000        [22,600]        9.7        [ 11.0  ]  12.5 
Fr 21,700         [2800]        8.5          [ 1.1 ]   14.0 
Ger 7200          [450]        2.5          [ 0.16 ]  68.1 
It 9055           [91]        4.7          [ 0.05 ]  47.0 
Sp 2700          1.8   64.3 
Ne 2700         [2680]        5.8         [ 5.8 ]  37.0  W.E. total 
Bel 770         [2000]        2.1         [ 5.4 ]  65.6  in Balkans: 
Den  1375          6.5   52.7       29.2% 
Nor 368          1.4   50.3  Excl. UK: 
Port  800          1.8   80.6      36.4%  
    
 
 
2008 
 
US 246,224    [79,132]           16.0        [ 5.1 ]    0.62% 
UK   19,594    [22,870]       12.2      [ 14.3 ]  0.88 
Fr   24,852       [2800]       10.0        [ 1.1 ]  7.8 
Ger     6354          [509]         2.6        [ 0.21 ]  37.6 
It     7591            [91]          4.1        [ 0.05 ]  32.4 
Sp     3025          2.0   33.9 
Ne     2535          [300]         6.2        [ 0.73 ]    3.64  W.E. total 
Bel     1269          3.3   15.0  in Balkans: 
Den      1133          3.8   28.3       13.25% 
Nor      544           2.9    7.04  Excl. UK: 
Port       698           1.6   44.1      18.3% 
  
 
 UNIFIL – U.N. Peacekeeping Mission in Lebanon, 2008 
 Number % of Deployed Troops 
Fr. 2177    8.8% 
Ger. 243    3.8% 
It. 2420   31.8% 
Sp. 1139   38.0  
Bel. 485   37.3%  
Port. 146   20.1%
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Major Operational Deployments 
 
Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991
266
 --   
Deployments by NATO Members     Percentage of Active-Duty Forces 
U.S.  697,000 
267
   32.9% 
U.K.    45,400   14.8% 
France    14,600       3.2% 
Canada      2000  
Italy       1200    0.31% 
Netherlands       600    0.58% 
Spain        500    0.18% 
Belgium       400    0.43% 
Greece        200 
Denmark       100    0.32% 
Norway        50     0.15% 
 
 
Bosnia:     IFOR  (1996) and     SFOR  (2000)
268
  -- NATO Member Contributions 
U.S.  16,500   4300 
U.K  13,000   1100 
France  10,000   2400 
Germany    4000   2050 
Italy     2100   1550  
Netherlands    2000   1000 
Turkey     1200   1050 
Canada    1000     900 
Greece     1000     100 
Portugal     900     323 
Denmark     800     300 
Spain  c. 700   1100 
Belgium    300      50 
Norway    100      50  
                                                 
266
      Nationmaster.com.  “Military Statistics – Gulf War Coalition Forces By Country.”  Online.  
Available:  http://www.Nationmaster.com/graph/mil_gul_war_coa_for-military-gulf-war-coalition-forces.  
Accessed on 26 February 2007. 
267
     Compare Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, “How Kuwait Was Won:  Strategy in the Gulf 
War,” International Security 16, no. 2 (Autumn 1991):  5-4, p. 25, n. 65.  Online.  JSTOR.  
http://www.jstor.org/ stable/pdfplus/2539059.pdf.   Accessed on 27 January 2007 (500,000 U.S. troops; 
35,000 British; 10,000 French.  Smaller figures may exclude rear support personnel in region but not in 
Saudi Arabia or Kuwait).     
268
      UN-Authorized Implementation Force (IFOR), led by NATO, and UN-Authorized Stabilization 
Force (SFOR) implemented by NATO from June 1998; data as of 4 March, 1996 and 28 June, 2000, 
respectively.  Steven R. Bowman, “Bosnia:  U.S. Military Operations,” Congressional Research Service 
Issue Brief for Congress, updated January 22, 2001; Comparative Bosnia-Herzegovina IFOR / SFOR 
Deployments, pp.   7-9.  Online.    https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/844/ 
IB93056_20010122.pdf? sequence=1.  Accessed on 10 April 2009.   
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KFOR, Kosovo 2000
269
  2008 --  NATO Member Contributions 
U.S.   6100   1514 
Italy   5850   2210 
Germany  5600   2270  
France   4800   1830 
U.K.   3500    173 
Netherlands  1650      13 
Canada  1300      
Norway  1250      30 
Spain   1230    639 
Belgium  1000    195  
Turkey   1000      
Denmark    900    311 
Greece     800      
Portugal   330    258 
 
Afghanistan              2005    2008     -- W.E. NATO Contributions 
UK                585               8330   
Fr              1265               3035 
Ger              1072              3310 
It              1246              2350 
Sp                525                780 
Ne                153              1776 
Bel                250                497 
Den                 190                750 
Nor                147                457 
Port                    8                  70 
[ US           18,000           31,700 ] 
 
Iraq       2005   2008    -- W.E. NATO Contributions 
UK       9200    4120 
Fr   
Ger   
It       3100       72  
Sp   
Ne      1100         7 
Bel   
Den         470       33 
Nor         12   
Port        128         8 
[ US  121,600          143,000 ]  
 
                                                 
269
      As of 12 January 2000 (i.e., roughly half a year after the aerial campaign).  U.K. Ministry of 
Defence, “Kosovo:  Current Deployments in Kosovo.”  Online.  Available:   http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/ 
deploymnets.htm.  Accessed on 26 February 2007. 
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Fatalities, Coalition Forces (NATO Members)  
 
Afghanistan, October 2001   Iraq, 19 March 2003  
         to 22 September 2009
270
           to 1 August 2009
271
  
 
U.S.   812          4320 
 
U.K.   217           179 
 
[Canada]  131      
 
Fr.    31     
 
Ger.    33 
  
It.    21            33  
 
Sp.    25                11 
 
Ne.      21              2 
 
Bel.      1               
 
Den.    25              7  
 
Nor.      4 
 
Port.       2 
 
 
                                                 
270
      Jason H. Campbell and Jeremy Shapiro, “Afghanistan Index” (Brookings Institution, 23 September 
2009).  Online.  www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/˜/media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index 
/index20090923.pdf.  Accessed on 31 October 2009.   
271
      Michael E. O‟Hanlon and Jason H. Campbell, “Iraq Index” (Brookings Institution, 20 August  2009).  
Online.  www.brookings.edu/saban/˜/media/Files/Center/Saban/Iraq%20index/index20090820.pdf.  
Accessed on 31 October 2009. 
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Forces Stationed or Deployed Abroad       (within Western Europe / abroad) 
1968-69 1974-75 1979-80 1984-85 1990-91         
 
U.S.      277K / 73K 301 K / 194K 308 K / 161K  
 
U.K.      67 K / 5.6 K 72 K / 20.7 K 67.2 K / 22 K 
 
Fr.      36 K / 27.7K 51.2K / 38 K 55.4 K / 32 K 
 
Ger.      0  0  naval det Med 
 
It.      0  / 130  / 177 
 
Sp.      / 16 K  / 16 K  / 10 K 
 
Ne.      5 K / 1400 5.5 K / 770 5.7 K / 650 
 
Bel.      25 K /  25 K /  24.9 K / 
 
Den.      / 365  / 341  / 384 
 
Nor.      / 942  / 838  / 953 
 
Port.      0  0  0 
 
 
1996-97 2002-03 2005-06  2007   
 
U.S.  111K / 150 K 104 K/ 148 K  103.5K /325 K   90,422 / 271,771 
              (I – 165.7 K; Af – 12 K) 
 
U.K.  29 K / 25 K 17.7 K / 16 K 22.6 K / 20 K  22,303 / 24,351 
         (I – 9500; A 6100)  
 
Fr.  15 K / 39 K 3 K / 32 K 2.8 K / 21.7 K  2800 / 26,016   
         ( Afgh. 1100) 
 
Ger.  / 5.1K  / 8.5 K  450 / 7200  409 / 9071 
         (Afgh 2900) 
 
It.  / 2.5K  93 / 6.5 K 91 / 9055  91 / 6592 
         (I 50; Af 1300) 
 
Sp.  / 1.7K  / 3050  / 2700      / 3400 
         (Afgh 625) 
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1996-97 2002-03 2005-06  2007   
 
 
Ne.  3.4K / 3.5K  2680 / 4130 2680 / 2700  2600 / 2442 
         (I 15; Af 1889) 
 
Bel.  2 K / 1240 2 K / 1475 2K / 770  / 654 (I 160; Af 150)  
 
Den.  ? ?  1210  / 1375   / 1329 (I 442; Af 380) 
 
Nor.   1650  1165  / 368   / 677 (I 12; Af 433) 
 
Port.  / 1250  / 1425  / 800   / 823 (I 8; Af 166) 
 
 
 
 81 
Appendix B:  Defense Spending, Personnel 
Strength, and Power Projection Assets Compared 
 
Rows represent: 
(1).  defense spending as a percentage of gross national (domestic) product. 
(2).  active-duty military personnel as a percentage of national population.  
(3).  ratio of the two proportions.    
(4).  total active duty forces (1000s). 
(5).  airlift aircraft (transport and tankers, etc.). 
     (a).  ratio of airlift assets to personnel (thousands).  
(6).  sealift vessels (supply, logistical support, transport; excluding amphibious). 
     (a).  ratio of sealift assets to personnel (thousands).  
 
U.K. Fr. Ger. It. Sp. Ne. Bel. Den. Nor. Port. U.S. 
 
68-69 5.7 5.3 4.3 2.9 2.3 4.0 2.8 2.6 4.0 6.7 9.8 
 .769 1.00 .779 .689 .943 .858 1.03 .94 .915 1.92 1.74
272
  
 7.41
273
 5.3 5.52 4.21 2.44 4.66 2.72 2.77 4.37 3.49 5.63 
 427 505 456 365 305 108.5 99 45.5 35 182.5 3500 
a/l 147 160 96 64 150 18 50 16 15 60 2590 
s/l [ data inadequate for comparison
274
 ]   
 
74-75 4.9 3.1 2.9 2.9 1.9 3.3 2.0 1.9 3.3 4.7 6.2 
 .631 .966 .789 .764 .806 .844 .915 .733 .873 2.36 1.02 
 7.76 3.21 3.68 3.80 2.36 3.91 2.19 2.59 3.78 1.99 6.08  
 354.6 502.5 490 421 284 113.9 89.7 37.1 34.9 217 2174 
a/l 144 195 56 93 20 ? 12 32 10 12 65 2348 
s/l [ data inadequate for comparison ] 
 
 
79-80 4.7 3.3 3.4 2.4 1.8 3.3 3.5 2.4 3.2 2.8 5.0 
 .577 .947 .804 .638 .860 .814 .867 .674 .954 .615 .917  
 8.15 3.48 4.23 3.76 2.09 4.05 4.04 3.56 3.35 4.55 5.45 
 322.9 509.3 495 365 321 114.8 86.8 34.7 39 60.5 2022 
a/l 87 197 97 33 89 12 25 11 14 27 1784 
s/l 3 2 19 2 2 [?] 2 -- 1 7 c. 571  
 
U.K. Fr. Ger. It. Sp. Ne. Bel. Den. Nor. Port. U.S. 
                                                 
272
      U.S. figures for manpower and spending, 1968-‟69, reflect peak of Vietnam War; other NATO states 
were not then involved in significant military operations.       
273
      High spending-to-manpower ratio reflects early U.K. adoption of fully professionalized, hence 
smaller, forces (1962), while maintaining substantial Royal Navy and strategic nuclear capability.  The 
most nearly comparable Continental power, France, had smaller Navy and retained conscription.     
274
      Figures in early editions The Military Balance do not adequately distinguish coastal and littoral 
support vessels from ocean-going ships, and therefore do not facilitate power projection comparisons.    
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U.K. Fr. Ger. It. Sp. Ne. Bel. Den. Nor. Port. U.S. 
 
84-85 5.3 4.2 4.1 2.6 2.5 3.3 3.4 2.5 3.0 3.4 6.5  
 .581 .863 .806 .647 .857 .717 .945 .61 .887 .623 .902 
 9.12 4.87 5.09 4.02 2.92 4.6 3.60 4.10 3.38 5.46  7.21 
 325.9 471.4 495 375.1 330 103.3 93.6 31.4 36.8 63.5 2136 
a/l 95 200 82 44 81 12 24 12 13 17 1905 
s/l 20 13 31 -- 2 -- 2 -- 1 -- [121 ] 
 
 
90-91 4.16 3.66 2.8 2.52 2.08 2.88 2.54 2.09 3.3 3.13 5.77 
 .54 .818 .777 .68 .689 .694 .932 .623 .812 .647 .851 
 7.7 4.47 3.6 3.71 3.02 4.15 2.73 3.35 4.06 4.84 6.78 
 306 461.2 469 389.6 274.5 102.6 92 31.7 34.1 68 2118 
a/l 103 141 138 44 66 12 24 6 13 20 1853 
 ratio .337 .306 .294 .113 .24 .117 .261 .189 .381 .294 .875  
s/l 22 19 21 5 3 2 2 2 0 2 239 
 ratio .072 .041 .045 .013 .011 .019 .022 .063 --- .029 .113 
 
 
96-97   3.1  3.1  2.0  1.8  1.5  2.2  1.7  1.8  2.6  2.9  3.8 
.41 .700 .419 .568 .526 .479 .468 .634 .686 .549 .582 
7.56 4.43 4.77 3.17 2.85 4.59 3.63 2.84 3.79 5.28 6.53 
239.6 409 339.9 328.7 206 74.4 47.2 33.1 30 54.2 1547 
a/l 94 146 89 58 62 7 16 5 12 22 1745 
 ratio .392 .357 .262 .176 .301 .094 .339 .151 .4 .406 1.128 
s/l 14 19 18 12 8 1 2 3 0 1 256 
 ratio .058 .046 .053 .037 .039 .013 .042 .091 --- .018 .165 
 
 
02-03 2.5 2.6 1.5 2.0 1.2 1.7 1.3 1.5 1.8 2.0 3.2 
 .365 .464 .376 .406 .366 .319 .387 .399 .601 .439 .502 
 6.85 5.6 3.99 4.93 3.28 5.33 3.36 3.76 3.0 4.56 6.37 
 211.4 273.7 308.4 230.4 143.5 50.4 39.4 21.4 26.7 43.6 1368 
a/l 82 167 90 52 48 10 18 6 9 22 2246 
 ratio .388 .61 .292 .226 .334 .198 .457 .28 .337 .504 1.642 
s/l 16 7 16 7 7 3 3 2 0 2 224 
 ratio .076 .026 .052 .03 .049 .059 .076 .093 --- .046 .164 
 
U.K. Fr. Ger. It. Sp. Ne. Bel. Den. Nor. Port. U.S. 
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U.K. Fr. Ger. It. Sp. Ne. Bel. Den. Nor. Port. U.S. 
 
05-06 2.3 2.0 1.1 1.04 0.84 1.64 .93 1.2 1.74 1.27 3.89 
 .34 .42 .346 .33 .364 .28 .35 .386 .566 .426 .503 
 6.76 4.76 3.18 3.15 2.31 5.86 2.66 3.11 3.07 2.98 7.73 
 205.9 255 284.5 191.9 147.3 46.3 36.9 21.2 25.8 44.9 1291 
a/l 91 190 98 71 99 11 23 6 9 22 2068 
 ratio .442 .745 .344 .37 .672 .238 .623 .283 .349 .49 1.602  
s/l 20 5 21 11 6 3 2 2 0 1 251 
 ratio .097 .020 .074 .057 .041  .065 .054 .094 ---  0.22 .194 
 
 
„07 2.27 1.56 1.20 .824 .730 1.46 .847 1.24 1.47 1.25 4.23 
 .315 .419 .298 .329 .365 .322 .382 .396 .509 .415 .505 
 7.21 3.72 4.03 2.50 2 4.53 2.22 3.13 2.89 3.01 8.38 
 191 254.9 245.7 191.1 147.3 53.1 39.7 21.6 23.4   44 1506 
a/l 110 151 96 33 96 9 14 6 9   30 1907 
 ratio .58 .59 .39 .17 .65 .17 .35 .28 .38 .68 1.27 
s/l 18 5 19 13 7 3 9 4 0    1 216 
 ratio .094 .020 .077 .068 .048 .056 .227 .185 --- .023 .143 
  
 
‟08 
(1). 2.33 1.54 1.19 0.96 0.73 1.35 0.81 1.26 1.22 1.19 4.78 
(2). 0.26 0.39 0.30 0.32 0.37 0.24 0.37 0.54 0.42 0.40 0.51 
(3). 8.96 3.95 3.97 3.0 1.97 5.63 2.19 2.33 2.9 2.98 9.37  
(4). 160 249 244 185 149 41 39 30 19 43 1539 
 
 U.K. Fr. Ger It. Sp. Ne. Bel. Den. Nor. Port. U.S. 
 
(1).  defense spending as a percentage of gross national (domestic) product. 
(2).  active-duty military personnel as a percentage of national population.  
(3).  ratio of the two proportions.          (4).  total active duty forces (1000s) 
(5).  airlift aircraft (transport and tankers, etc.). 
     (a).  ratio of airlift assets to personnel (thousands).  
(6).  sealift vessels (supply, logistical support, transport; excluding amphibious). 
     (a).  ratio of sealift assets to personnel (thousands).  
 
 
NOTES  on  DATA 
 
PROXIES.  Power projection proxy assets:  airlift (“a/l”:  transport and tanker) aircraft, 
and sealift (“s/l”):  logistical support, supply, cargo, transport) vessels.  These are 
indispensable to intercontinental operations on any substantial scale.  The ratio of these 
assets to manpower (1000s) indicates degree of the force‟s expeditionary capability.   
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An alternative proxy to sealift might be amphibious ships and craft, capable of approach 
to and landing on beaches under fire.  This is a specialized subset of seaborne operations, 
however, and as a proxy of deployability would tend to be narrow and under-inclusive.    
 
Other proxy candidates would be less representative:  aircraft carriers (predominantly 
U.S., needed for maritime control and defense functions as well as power projection); 
heavy bombers (solely U.S. since phasing-out of British strategic bomber force in early 
1980s, but strongly associated with strategic nuclear role, as one element of nuclear 
deterrent triad); fighter and ground attack aircraft (latter, in particular, probably 
indispensable to power projection, but both also necessary for territorial defense);  
armored vehicles – cannot be moved without heavy sealift capacity, and central to 
territorial defense.   
 
SPENDING  RATIOS.  A high ratio of defense expenditure to manpower can of course 
result from a very low level of personnel; thus, only states with both relatively high 
spending per GDP and a high spending / manpower ratio possess capital-intensive forces.   
 
 
Public Spending as  Percentage of GDP, 2006 
 
U.S. U.K. Fr. Ger. It. Sp. Ne. Bel. Den. Nor. Port. 
 
Total 34.5 45.0 53.0 46.0 50.0 38.0 46.0 49.0 51.0 --- 46.0  
 
Net* 30.6 42.7 51.0 44.9 49.0 37.2 44.4 48.1 49.8 --- 44.7 
 
*  excluding defense spending.   
 
As of 2004, among the 27 EU member states, 70 percent of public spending was devoted 
to what could broadly be termed welfare priorities:  health care, education, recreation and 
culture, housing, and “social protection.”  Another 27 percent was for “general public 
services,” “economic affairs,” law enforcement and public safety, and environmental 
protection; the remaining three percent went to defense.      
 
Source:  Ulrike Mandl, Adriaan Dierx, and Fabienne Ilzkovitz, “European Economy:  
The Effectiveness and Efficiency of Public Spending,” Economic Papers 301 (Brussels:  
European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs,  
February 2008):  1-36, pp. 10 - 11.   
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* * * * * * * * * * * *  
 
Defense Spending, Percentage of GDP, Post-Cold War      
Source:  The Military Balance.   
 
 
U.S. U.K. Fr. Ger. It. Sp. Ne. Bel. Den. Nor. Port.   
 
2008 4.78 2.33 1.54 1.19 0.96 0.73 1.35 0.81 1.26 1.22 1.19 
 
2007 4.23 2.27 1.56 1.20 .824 .730 1.46 .847 1.24 1.47 1.25  
 
05-06 3.89 2.3 2.0 1.1 1.04 0.84 1.64 .93 1.2 1.74 1.27 
  
02-03 3.2 2.5 2.6 1.5 2.0 1.2 1.7 1.3 1.5 1.8 2.0 
 
96-97 3.8 3.1 3.1 2.0 1.8 1.5 2.2 1.7 1.8 2.6 2.9 
 
90-91 5.77 4.16 3.66 2.8 2.52 2.08 2.88 2.54 2.09 3.3 3.13 
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* * * * * * * * * * * *  
 
Spending on “Personnel” as Percentage of Total 
Defense Expenditures.  Source:  NATO275 (before 2004, period averages 
only.)  
 
 
 
        1990-1994      1995-1999      2000-2004            2004            2007 ____                
 
US  39.3  39  36.1  34.4  31.8  
 
UK  42.2  39.4  39.4  39.8  38.8 
 
Fr.  -----  58.2  59.6  57.4  57.1 
 
Ger.  57.4  61.5  60.0  59.3  54.9   
 
It.  63.6  71.8  73.1  75.3  72.8  
 
Sp.  64.9  66.5  58.2  53.9  53.0 
 
Ne.  56.9  54.6  50.6  50.5  47.2 
 
Bel.   68.3  69.3  70.4  73.6  78.9 
 
Den.   57.5  59.8  52.8  53.4  50.6 
 
Nor.    40.6  38  39.8  41.3  43.2 
 
Port.    77.3  80.8  79.8  74.2  78.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
275
      NATO Press Release, “Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence,” 19 February 
2009.  NATO calculations allocate total defense expenditure to four categories:  personnel, equipment, 
infrastructure, and “other.”    
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Note on NATO and Member Sovereignty    
 
 
NATO “operates as a „loose‟ or unintegrated structure in which sovereign allies 
maintain both policy independence and discretionary power over military 
expenditures.”276  In general, the “member states have not committed themselves to go 
along with any decision that they disagree with.”277  More specifically,     
[T]he allies decide the overwhelming portion of their defense spending 
independently.  . . .   For the 1970s, common funding was a little less than 
1 percent of NATO‟s total defense spending, so that over 99 percent . . . 
[was] at the discretion of the allies.  . . .   Although allies discuss defense 
strategies, weapon requirements, and defense planning, actual defense 
outlays are primarily decided at the country level, where domestic trade-
offs and political influence affect the outcome.  Even when agreements to 
increase defense spending are [made] – for example, the pledged 3 percent 
increase in real defense spending given at a 1978 Council meeting – there 
is no provision to enforce such agreements.
278
   
 
The Treaty‟s organizational provisions do not incorporate any requirement of 
unanimity for action by its members, except with respect to the admission of new 
members.
279
  Consultation among members is prescribed; but there is no provision for 
“majority rule” binding on a minority, or any other means to compel assent by an 
unwilling member.  Thus, members may agree on and undertake joint action without 
unanimous consent; but their decisions do not bind dissenters.  Neither, however, does 
any member have a “veto” over policy or joint action.280   
 
                                                 
276
      Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, The Political Economy of NATO:  Past, Present, and Into the 
Twentieth Century (Cambridge, U.K.:  Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 27.   
277
      Ibid. at p. 27.   
278
      Ibid., pp. 27-28.   
279
      Article 10, The North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949; in The Atlantic Alliance:  Jackson 
Subcommittee Hearings and Findings, Documents, p. 282. 
280
      The Atlantic Alliance:  Jackson Subcommittee Hearings and Findings, p. 20. 
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Even in the event of an “armed attack against one or more” members – under 
Article 5, to be considered “an attack against them all” -- each state is required only to 
render such aid “as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force. . . .”281  Action 
is not formally obligatory under the terms of the Treaty.  This “loose” alliance structure 
was deemed sufficient, since a Soviet assault on Western Europe, the chief military 
hazard against which NATO was formed, would present so obvious and immediate a 
threat to  members generally that all could be expected to appreciate the need for (and to 
contribute to) a mutual defensive effort.        
In sum, the NATO member states retain essentially all of their sovereign authority 
on defense matters, including decisions on spending, force structure, and military 
deployments.   
                                                 
281
      Article 5, The North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949; in The Atlantic Alliance:  Jackson Subcommittee 
Hearings and Findings, Documents, p. 282. 
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